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Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
This report presents the findings of an extensive audit of media coverage of 
the 2005 UK General Election conducted by the Communication Research 
Centre, Loughborough University on behalf of the Electoral Commission. The 
report is organised into the following chapters 
 
Chapter 1: Mapping Media Coverage of the 2005 UK General Election: the 
results of the quantitative analysis of media content (pages 7-43) 
(David Deacon, Dominic Wring & Peter Golding) 
Chapter 2: Politics as an Appearance and Reality Show: the results of the 
analysis of qualitative aspects of coverage (pages 44-59) (Michael 
Billig) 
Chapter 3: The Internet and the UK General Election (pages 60 - 71) (John 
Downey and Scott Davidson) 
Chapter 4: Women’s Magazines during the election (pages 72 - 75) (Dominic 
Wring and David Deacon) 
 
Executive Summary 
The Extent of National Media Coverage of the Campaign  
 
For the UK National Media, the 2005 General Election was just one of several 
news stories in town. The low levels of coverage particularly at the start of the 
campaign can be partly explained by the coincidence of other major news 
events that colonised a significant amount of the available news space, but 
this may not be sole factor. Certainly, this is not the first campaign in which 
other significant news events have intruded into proceedings1. 
 
The displacement effect of other news events may signal a growing 
disengagement with among certain sections of the national media with the 
formal political process. Although disconnection from the election was most 
evident with the populist national press, longitudinal comparisons also reveal 
an election-by-election decline in the amount of election coverage for the BBC 
flagship news and current affairs programmes between 1992 and 2005. 
(Levels of coverage slightly increased for the main ITV news programme in 
2005, from a considerable low in 2001, thereby closing the coverage gap 
noted in previous elections with BBC 1 coverage.) The steep reduction from 
levels of BBC1 coverage since 1997 is mainly explained by the BBC’s 
decision not to lengthen their flagship news bulletins in 2005, as in 2001. But 
this decision alone may be taken as indicative of the emergence of a more 
‘pragmatic’, news value based approach to electoral reporting in the UK, in 
which the campaign must compete for prominence, rather than command it as 
of right.  
 
Having said this, the results from 2005 suggest one important reversal of 
respect previous tends in media presentation. For a number of years analysts 
have been claiming that the media have been trivialising politics and that one 
                                                 
1 For example, in the 1992 Election Campaign a royal divorce was announced. 
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example of this has been the sound-bite culture of presentation. However, in 
this election, for the first time since 1992, the average length of politicians’ 
sound-bites increased in mainstream TV news coverage. 
 
Stop Watch Balance in the National Media  
 
In the 2005 election, the Labour Party received more national press and 
broadcast coverage than their political opponents. This difference was 
greatest in the national press, but also evident in national broadcast content. 
There is no evidence, however, that this situation was unique to this election 
or the by-product of the recent change to a regime of self regulation by the 
broadcasters in their monitoring of the amount of coverage given to the main 
political parties. Comparisons with elections since 1992 show that the 
incumbent political party has consistently commanded higher levels of media 
attention, and that the political prominence of Labour in 2005 exactly mirrored 
that achieved by the Conservative party in 1992.    
 
In previous elections analysts have commented upon the trend towards 
‘presidentialisation’, or the focus by the media on the party leaders. As with 
previous elections, a large proportion of national election reporting in 2005 
fixed upon the comments and activities of the three main party leaders. 
Interestingly, however, levels of presidentialisation in the national media 
appeared lower than those found in the 1992, 1997 and 2001 campaigns. 
 
One area where there was no change was in the amount of coverage given to 
women and women’s issues.  Women candidates were an even more 
marginalised presence in coverage than they were in the actual election 
process itself, and few of the other elite opinion formers reported were 
women. Women most frequently appeared as members of the public or as 
familial associates of (male) politicians. Writing in the mid 1980s, Patricia 
Holland remarked that news coverage routinely presents women  
 
‘…either as an anonymous example of uninformed public opinion, as 
housewife, consumer, neighbour, or as a mother, sister, wife of the 
man in the news… Thus not only do they speak less frequently, but 
they tend to speak as passive reactors and witnesses to public events 
rather than as participants in those events’ (138-9) 
 
Twenty years later, it offers an excellent summation of the situation in the 
2005 campaign. 
 
Agenda Balance in the National Media 
 
‘Iraq’, ‘Asylum and Immigration’ and ‘Political improprieties’ were the most 
prominent substantive issues addressed in national coverage. However, as 
with previous elections, the biggest election story was the electoral process 
itself (party campaigning strategies and activities, opinion polls, etc). 
Moreover, national media tended to avoid providing manifesto and policy 
details in their coverage, focusing more on political impressions than 
information. 
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There were some striking differences in the specific news agendas of different 
national media. For example, the mid market tabloids (which all declared their 
support for the Conservative Party) gave more coverage to ‘Iraq’ and ‘political 
improprieties’ than other national media, concentrating much of the latter 
discussion upon the personal integrity of the Prime Minister. In contrast, Iraq 
was considerably relegated in the populist tabloid agenda. 
 
Overall, the national media agenda was restricted to a limited range of topics, 
and many issues that became big news stories in the immediate aftermath of 
the campaign were sidelined during the election (most noticeably, ‘Europe’, 
‘Transport policy’, ‘the Environment’, ‘Northern Ireland’, ‘Terrorism’ and 
‘Foreign Policy [other than Iraq]’).  
 
Directional Balance in National Coverage 
 
UK-wide coverage tended to present Labour political actors in a more 
defensive posture than their party opponents in national coverage and when 
the media reported issues that were directly identified with Labour, the 
reporting tended to emphasise the possible negative electoral consequences 
for the party.  
 
Broadcast and ‘Quality’ press coverage were the most directionally balanced 
– tending to focus upon the ‘mixed’ and ‘general’ party political implications of 
themes reported. In contrast, coverage in the national mid-market press was 
the most hostile to Labour and the most receptive to the Conservatives. This 
tendency was reversed to a more limited extent in the populist press, where 
‘bad news’ for the Tories exceeded negative coverage of Labour. 
 
Any suggestion that these data may suggest that the national popular press 
are re-embracing the strong political partisanship so evident in the 1980s is 
tempered by closer analysis of their editorial declarations. Although 
opprobrium of the government was widely evident, so were reservations and 
qualifications about the political alternatives on offer. 
 
Election Coverage in Scotland, Wales and the East Midlands 
 
Plaid Cymru and the Scottish Nationalists gained some media presence in 
Wales and Scotland respectively, but the main parties still dominated the 
media agenda in the regional and other national media sample.  As with UK-
wide media, the Labour party commanded most coverage in the Scottish, 
Welsh and East Midlands media, but the coverage gap was not as great in 
these quarters. 
 
Reporting of the electoral process itself commanded the greatest proportion of 
coverage in Scotland, Wales and the East Midlands. Beyond this aspect, 
however, there were some noticeable interpretative differences across these 
regions. In Wales and Scotland, constitutional issues concerning devolution 
were considerably more prominent in the news agenda. ‘Asylum & 
Immigration’ did not feature highly on the Welsh media agenda, but issues 
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concerning the NHS attracted a higher proportion of press and broadcast 
attention in this context. In the East Midlands, NHS and Crime featured 
particularly prominently.  
 
Measures of directional balance suggest that coverage in Wales and the East 
Midlands had a more diffuse and less partisan focus than Scottish and UK 
wide news coverage.  
 
The Qualitative Analysis 
 
The qualitative analysis concentrated upon exploring the subtle ways in 
which the television media might present politicians as figures to be 
distrusted.  One of the strengths of qualitative analysis is that it permits 
the in-depth analysis of routine, non-dramatic sequences of talk. Thus, we 
examined how in the early parts of the election, television news programmes 
introduced political items and how their own political experts offered 
interpretations. Routinely, the experts and news-presenters treated the 
words of politicians as being in need of interpretation, in order to 
demonstrate the so-called 'underlying reality' behind the 'spin'. This 
assumption was in-built into the rhetorical structures of presentation with 
the effect that politicians were routinely presented in ways that encourage 
'the hermeneutics of suspicion'. This can be seen forcefully in ‘Paxman-style’ 
interviewing.  In this way, the presenters and interpreters regularly mediate 
the words of the politicians. Several examples were analysed in detail to show 
how this pattern of trusting the expert interpreters and distrusting the 
politicians has become a routine feature of news presentation. As such, the 
conventions of political reporting and interviewing may be contributing to the 
widespread distrust of politicians which has been regularly identified by 
opinion poll data,  
 
The Internet and ‘Blogging’ 
 
The Internet played a no more significant role in the 2005 General Election 
than it did in 2001. In terms of campaigning, political parties primarily 
saw the Internet as a way of raising funds and communicating with activists 
rather than as a direct vote-winner. The 2005 general election was the 
first, however, where citizens en masse sought out information and opinion 
on websites, particularly the BBC News website and Guardian Unlimited. 
However, the majority of citizens who seek out political information 
on-line belong to relatively wealthy and well-educated groups and make up a 
small percentage of the UK population. The mainstream news websites do not 
offer a substantially different fair from other sources. The significance 
of blogging was hyped in the UK before the election but proved to 
be of little importance during the election campaign. Several mainstream 
news media, however, incorporated blogs as an adjunct to their conventional 
reporting.  
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Women’s Magazines and the 2005 Election 
 
Although the best selling magazine Take A Break proclaimed this was the  
'first UK women's election' this was not borne out if measured by the scant  
coverage of the campaign in the burgeoning number of weekly magazine  
designed for a predominantly female audience.  Even the obvious human  
interest story involving the birth of Charles Kennedy's son failed to  
generate much response and the majority of titles analysed remained entirely  
devoid of politics despite their partly news driven formats.  There were,  
however, some exceptions including features with the main leaders,  
photo-opportunities and interviews with prominent women including the  
Conservative leader's wife Sandra Howard.   
 
References 
 
Holland, P. (1987) ‘When and Woman Reads the News’ in H. Baehr and 
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Chapter 1: Mapping Media Coverage of the 2005 UK General Election 
 
Dr David Deacon, Dr Dominic Wring & Professor Peter Golding  
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of a quantitative content analysis of election 
news reporting in national, regional and local media during the 2005 General 
Election Campaign.   
 
1.1: Sampling 
Table 1.1 lists (a) the media sampled for the quantitative content analysis (see 
columns 1-3), and (b) on-line and magazine discussed in chapters 2 & 3. 
Sampling began on Monday 4 April and ended on Friday 6 May (respectively, 
the day preceding the formal announcement of the commencement of the 
campaign and the day after polling). 
 
With the broadcast media, all items that made any reference to the 2005 
election campaign were included in the analysis. With the print media, all 
election related items that appeared in the following sections of the 
newspapers were coded 
 
• The front page 
• The first two pages of the domestic news section 
• The first two pages of any specialist section assigned to the coverage 
of the campaign 
• The page containing and facing papers’ leader editorials. 
  
The rationale here was to concentrate our analysis on the prioritized news 
arenas in the press. 
 
Table 1.1: Media Sample   
 TV News Radio Press Magazines Internet 
Websites & 
Blogs 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
National 
– UK 
• BBC1 
10pm 
• BBC 
• ITV 
10.30pm 
• C4 , 7pm 
• C5, 7pm 
• Sky News 
9pm 
• R4 Today 
07.30-08.30 
• R1 Newsbeat 
• ‘Quality’ 
Newspapers 
(Guardian, 
Observer, 
Telegraph, 
Sunday 
Telegraph, 
Times, Sunday 
Times, Financial 
Times, 
Independent, 
Independent on 
Sunday) 
 
• ‘Mid 
• Bella 
• Best 
• Chat 
• Closer 
• Heat 
• Hello! 
• My 
Weekly 
• New! 
• Now 
• OK! 
• Peoples  
        Friend 
• Reveal 
• Labour  
• Conservative 
• Lib Dem 
• UKIP 
• National 
Newspaper 
websites 
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Market’ 
Newspapers 
 (Mail, Mail on 
Sunday, 
Express, Sunday 
Express) 
 
 
• ’Populist’ 
Newspapers 
(Sun, News of 
the World, 
Mirror, Sunday 
Mirror, People, 
Star, Star on 
Sunday) 
• Star 
• Take A  
        Break 
• That's Life 
• The Lady 
• Woman 
• Woman's 
        Own 
Other 
National 
• BBC 
Wales 1830-
1900 
ITV1 Wales 
1800-1830 
• BBC 
Scotland 1830-
1900 
ITV1 Scotland 
1800-1830 
• Radio Good 
Morning Wales 
07.30-08 00 
 
• BBC Radio 
Scotland 07.30-
0800 
 
• Sunday 
Mail 
• Daily 
Record 
• Scotland on 
Sunday 
• The 
Scotsman 
- • Plaid Cymru 
• SNP 
Regional • ITV1 
Central News 
at Six 
BBC East 
Midlands 
Today 
• BBC Radio 
Nottingham 07.30-
0800 
-  - - 
Local - - • Derby 
Evening 
Telegraph 
• Nottingham 
Evening Post 
• Leicester 
Mercury 
• Lincolnshire 
Echo 
- • Selected 
examples of 
constituency 
websites 
• Selected 
examples of local 
news websites 
 
1.2: Structure of this Chapter 
Sections 2 to 4 of this chapter deal solely with national UK news coverage of 
the 2005 Election campaign. Section 2 examines the extent of election 
coverage across the sampled media. The next three sections examine this 
coverage in more detail in relation, utilizing a tri-partite distinction suggested 
by Norris et al. (1999: 20) between: 
 
• Stop Watch Balance – the relative prominence given to competing 
political actors in news reporting (section 3). 
• Agenda Balance – the relative prominence given to the various issues 
that are associated with a particular topic or event (section 4). 
• Directional Balance – the amount of positive and negative coverage 
given to various political actors and issues (section 5). 
 
Section 6 of the chapter examines trends in election related coverage in the 
Scottish, Welsh and East Midlands media.
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Section 2: The Extent of National Coverage of the Campaign 
 
Compared with the previous two campaigns there was less certainty about the 
outcome of the 2005 vote, but it took some time for national coverage of the 
election to gain cumulative momentum from the commencement of the 
campaign on 5 April. Figures 2.1 to 2.4 outline the amount of Election related 
coverage produced in all national media, on a week-by-week basis during the 
total sample period.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Amount of Election National TV News
Coverage (4 April - 6 May 2005)
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The following main points emerge: 
 
• Levels of coverage in the first week of the campaign were low 
compared with subsequent weeks. This can be explained, at least in 
part, by two other significant news events that coincided with the start 
of the campaign – the death and burial of the Pope and the Royal 
wedding between Prince Charles and Camilla Parker Bowles. 
 
• In the national ‘quality’ daily press2, levels increased significantly in the 
second week and steadily increased thereafter (see figure 2.1). 
 
• In the Mid Market daily press sector3, coverage peaked in week 3 and 
then slightly reduced during the last two weeks of the election (see 
figure 2.1). 
 
• In the Populist daily press sector4, attention to the election only 
significantly increased in the last week of the campaign (n.b. aggregate 
levels of coverage in this sector was slightly lower in week 3 than it was 
in week 1.) (See figure 2.1) 
 
• For the national broadcast media5, levels of coverage increased 
steadily through the first four weeks of the campaign, but then reduced 
slightly during the last week (see figure 2.2). 
 
                                                 
2 The Guardian, The Financial Times, The Times, The Independent and the The Daily Telegraph. 
3 The Daily Mail and Daily Express 
4 The Daily Mirror, The Star and The Sun 
5 National Broadcast=BBC1 10 pm News, ITN 10.30 News, C4 7pm News, BBC2 Newsnight, C5 News, Sky 9pm 
News, BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ (07.30-08.30), BBC Radio 1 ‘Newsbeat’ (17.45-18.00) 
 
Figure 2.3: Extent of Election Related News Coverage in
National Sunday Press (10 April - 1  May 2005) 
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• The amount of coverage in the National weekly press was far more 
volatile and variable, at least during the early stages of the campaign 
(see figure 2.3).  In the national ‘quality’6 and ‘mid market’ press7 
sectors, the amount of coverage reduced between 10 April and 17 
April, whereas for the ‘populist’ press, coverage increased during this 
period and then fell back on 24 April. Levels then rose for all three 
sectors for the remaining publication dates prior to the vote on 5 May. 
 
 
Table 2.1 provides further evidence regarding the extent to which the more 
popular national newspapers engaged with the campaign. The data show the 
number of occasions that these titles ran election related stories on their front 
pages during the campaign. Overall, only 1 in 5 of the available front pages in 
the populist and mid market press carried any election related news. 
 
Table 2.1: Number of Days During the Campaign that the Election Made 
the Front Page in the Mid Market and Populist Press 
 
Title Number of days with a 
front page election 
story 
Percentage of all days 
sampled 
The Sun 7 21 
The Daily Mirror 5 15 
The Star 3 9 
The Daily Mail 11 33 
The Daily Express 8 24 
 
Alongside the death of the Pope and the Royal Wedding, another news story 
broke during the campaign that attracted a significant amount attention in 
some sections of the national media. These were the allegations made by a 
former employee of the celebrity couple David and Victoria Beckham 
regarding the state of their marriage. This story broke in the penultimate week 
of campaigning, and coincided with the final publication of Lord Goldsmith’s 
confidential advice to the UK government about the legality of engaging in 
military action against Iraq. Whilst the latter disclosures attracted considerable 
comment in some media sectors and brought the issue of Iraq to the forefront 
of the election agenda (see section 4), they attracted scant attention in the 
populist press. Table 2.2 compares the total space dedicated to the Goldsmith 
story with the coverage give to the Beckham’s marriage in the populist and 
mid market news sectors. 
 
                                                 
6 The Observer, The Sunday Telegraph, The Independent on Sunday, The Sunday Times 
7 The Mail on Sunday, The Sunday Express 
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Table 2.2: Tabloid Engagement with the Election Campaign – A 
comparison of coverage of David and Victoria Beckham’s marriage (25 
April) with coverage of the leaking of Lord Goldsmith’s legal advice on 
Iraq (28 April) 
 
 
David and Victoria Beckham’s 
Marriage 
25 April 
 
Leaking of Goldsmith's legal 
advice 
28 April 
 
Mirror 2146 cm2 204 cm2 
Star 2269 cm2 864 cm2 
Sun 2141 cm2 72 cm2 
Mail 2069 cm2 3577 cm2 
Express 756 cm2 1577 cm2 
 
In the Mirror, Star and Sun, the amount of coverage given to the Posh and 
Becks’ marriage story on 25th  April far exceeded coverage given to the 
leaked Goldsmith’s document on 28th April 
 
With the Mail and Express, coverage of the latter exceeded the former, but 
the Mail in particular seemed greatly fascinated with both of these ‘inside 
stories’. 
 
2.1: Levels of Coverage in Context 
 
These data suggest that at least certain sections of the national UK media 
had little initial or sustained interest in the 2005 campaign. This raises the 
question as to whether this apparent distraction was unique to 2005 or 
indicative of a longer term process of political disengagement.  
 
The Communication Research Centre at Loughborough University has 
conducted investigations into national news election reporting for every UK 
general election since 1992. Although these were separate studies, it is 
possible to draw some comparisons across the data sets to assess how 
election-reporting practices may (or may not) have changed.  
 
Figure 2.4 compares the amount of election related coverage in three flagship 
television news programmes over the last four UK general elections8.  
 
The results show that: 
 
• There was a sharp decline in the amount of election related coverage 
in BBC1 Main Evening News and BBC2 Newsnight coverage between 
the 1997 and 2001 election campaigns. The trajectory of this decline 
reduced with the 2005 campaign, but the amount of coverage 
continued on a down-wards trend.  
 
                                                 
8 It is not possible to conduct an equivalent comparison in levels of national press coverage 
from 1992-2005, due to differences in the sampling and measurement procedures adopted in 
the four studies.   
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• In contrast, the amount of election related coverage on the main ITV 
evening news bulletin increased from a low point in 2001. Moreover, 
the clear gap evident in the previous 3 campaigns between the amount 
of election coverage on BBC1 and ITV news disappeared. 
 
• A major reason for this closure of the BBC/ ITV ‘coverage gap’ in 2005 
was ITV news’s broadcast of comparatively lengthy interviews with the 
three main party leaders in their bulletins.  These three items 
accounted for just over 6 percent of the total election broadcast time on 
the ITV news programme during the sample period. 
 
 
Notes: Daily averages were calculated by dividing the sum of all coverage by the number of days sampled. 
 
 
2.2: Sound-bite Politics 1992 -  2005 
 
Analysts in the US and UK have frequently remarked upon the emergence of 
a ‘sound bite’ culture in mainstream politics. The term first emerged in the 
1980s to describe how politicians, adapting to the logic of media formats, 
have sought to organise their public communication around brief, pithy and 
memorable phrases. One US study found that the average amount of time 
political candidates were presented speaking in an uninterrupted way in TV 
news items reduced from 43 seconds in 1968 to 9 seconds in 1988 (Hallin, 
1992).   
 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 compare the average length of quotation of actors in the 
two flagship national news programmes since 1992 (BBC1 and ITV Evening 
news bulletins). The results show that an election-on-election compression in 
average speaking time of a politician between 1992 and 2001 was reversed to 
some extent in 2005.9 This change was most dramatic for the ITV evening 
news, where for the first time party political leaders and all political actors had 
                                                 
9 The averages presented here cannot be simply compared to those derived from US studies. This is because our 
figures represent the total amount of speaking time a specific individual had in a news item. As such, these figures 
are in many cases based on the aggregation of sound-bite time, rather than individual speech acts. 
Figure 2.4: Amount of Election Relations National
TV Coverage 1992 - 2005
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a higher average speaking time than they did on BBC1 news (see Figure 2.5). 
The difference between the two programmes in 2005 was mainly caused by 
ITV’s inclusion of three lengthy interviews with the main party leaders in their 
bulletins. Figure 2.6 provides the averages with these three outlying values 
excluded. With this calculation a gap reappears between BBC1 and ITV in 
average quotation time for political sources. Nevertheless, these adjusted 
data still indicate that average quotation times were less compressed than 
they were in 2001.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Average Length of Politicians' 
Soundbites on BBC1 and ITV Main
Evening News Programmes (4 April - 6 
May 2005) (Unadjusted figures) 
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Figure 2.6: Average Length of 
Politicians' Soundbites on BBC1 and 
ITV Main Evening News Programmes (4 
April - 6 May 2005) (adjusted figures) 
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Section 3: Stop Watch Balance  
 
Stop-watch balance concerns the degree of parity in the space given to 
political competitors in news coverage. Two measures were used to assess 
this dimension of election related national news coverage: (a) the frequency 
with which party political figures appeared as ‘active participants’ in election 
related items10, and (b) the amount of direct quotation allocated to them in 
those appearances where they were directly quoted11. The former measure 
assesses news presence (i.e. which political sources are the most frequent 
subjects and participants in routine news coverage) the latter assesses news 
access (as a general principle, the extent and frequency with which a source 
is quoted is an indication of their news status and credibility).  
 
3.1: The Party Political Arena 
 
Table 3.1 compares these two measures of ‘stop watch’ balance in National 
UK coverage (by media sector) 
 
Table 3.1: Stop Watch Balance in National Media Coverage12: The 
Frequency of Appearance and Amount of Direct Quotation of Party 
Political Actors by Media Sector (4 April to 6 May 2005) 
 
 National  
Broadcast 
National ‘Quality’ 
Press 
National  
Mid Market 
Press 
National Populist 
Press 
 Appear ances Quota- tion Appearan-ces Quota-tion Appear-ances Quota-tion Appear- ances Quota- tion 
 % % % % % % % % 
Blair 12 14 15 7 20 18 21 39 
Brown 3 2 7 8 5 4 7 5 
Other Labour 21 22 29 31 33 25 28 24 
Howard 13 13 10 19 13 28 13 19 
Other Conservative 17 19 21 20 17 15 17 7 
Kennedy 9 9 6 6 4 3 5 2 
Other Lib Dem 15 13 10 4 6 5 8 2 
Other Party 11 8 4 5 2 2 1 1 
         
(Base N) 1441 46393 
(secs) 
2505 56337 
(words) 
506 14419 
(words) 
765 20967 
(words) 
Notes 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 An ‘actor’ was defined as an individual or institution whose actions, opinions or existence were directly mentioned 
in a news item. But this was not the sole test. The individual/ institution mentioned had to have some independent 
status within the piece, i.e. they had an active presence and their views and actions were not simply mentioned or 
discussed by another actor. 
11 Quotation time for broadcast coverage was measured in seconds and for press coverage in the number of directly 
quoted words. 
12 National Broadcast=BBC1 10 pm News, ITN 10.30 News, C4 7pm News, BBC2 Newsnight, C5 News, Sky 9pm 
News, BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ (07.30-08.30), BBC Radio 1 ‘Newsbeat’ (17.45-18.00) 
‘National “Quality” Press’ = Guardian, Observer, Independent, Independent on Sunday, Daily Telegraph, Sunday 
Telegraph, Times, Sunday Times, Financial Times. 
‘National Mid Market Press’= Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, Daily Express, Express on Sunday 
‘National Populist Press’ = Sun, News of the World, Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, People, Star, Star on Sunday. 
Up to 5 Political actors could be coded per item. 
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The following main points emerge: 
 
• The strength of association between these measures of news presence 
and news access varied across media sectors. The strongest 
correlation was found for broadcast content (0.964), followed by the 
‘quality’ press (0.847), Mid Market tabloids (0.805) and populist titles 
(0.786). There were two noticeable discrepancies between these 
measures. In the ‘Mid Market Press’ Tony Blair appeared more 
frequently than Michael Howard in election related coverage (20% to 
13%, respectively), but Michael Howard was more extensively quoted 
than the Prime Minister (28% compared with 18%, respectively). In the 
‘Populist’ press, Tony Blair accounted for 21% of the political 
appearances coded, but nearly 40% of the direct quotation space for all 
political sources.  
 
• Labour party sources received higher levels of coverage than their 
party opponents across all national media sectors. (See Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 for visual summaries of the differences between the parties in 
(a) the frequency with which they appeared and (b) the extent of their 
quotation.) The differences were smallest in national Broadcast 
coverage, and greatest for the mid market and populist press. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of the Frequency of 
Appearance of Political Party Actors by National 
Media Sector
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• There was a two party squeeze in all national press coverage, which 
marginalized the Liberal Democrats and minor political parties. 
 
• There was a marked ‘Presidentialisation’ in all national election 
coverage – i.e. a significant proportion of coverage in all sectors 
focused upon the main party leaders. This trend was most evident in 
the populist newspaper coverage, where the three main party leaders 
accounted for 39 percent of all politician appearances and 60 percent 
of direct quotation space.  The next most leader-orientated coverage 
was in the ‘mid market’ press, with the three main party leaders 
accounting for 37 per cent of all party political source appearances and 
49 percent of directly quoted speech, followed by national broadcast 
coverage, where Tony Blair, Michael Howard and Charles Kennedy – 
34 percent of appearances and 36 percent of quotes. National ‘quality’ 
newspaper coverage was the least presidentialised, but not to any 
significant extent (i.e. 31% of appearances and 32% of direct quotation 
space).  
 
• Table 3.2 (derived from a recalculation of the results in Table 3.1) 
compares the prominence of reporting of the main party leaders in the 
aggregate coverage of their respective parties. These results show that 
coverage of the main opposition parties tended to be slightly more 
leader-focused than coverage of Labour party.  
 
Table 3.2: Proportional Prominence of Main Party Leaders in their 
Parties’ Total Coverage by National Media Sector 
 National  
Broadcast 
National ‘Quality’ 
Press 
National  
Mid Market 
Press 
National Populist 
Press 
 Appearances Appearances Appearances Appearances 
Tony Blair 33% 25% 34% 38% 
Michael Howard 43% 32% 43% 43% 
Charles Kennedy 35% 38% 40% 38% 
Figure 3.2: Comparison of the Amount of Direct
Quotation by National Media Sector
0 
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Broadcast Quality
Press
Mid Market
Press
Populist
Press
Percentage
Labour
Conservative 
Liberal Democrat 
Other Parties 
  Communication Research Centre 
19
 
3.2: Trends in Stop Watch Balance in Election Coverage 1992-2005 
 
In this section we compare these ‘stop watch’ balance results for 2005 with 
previous UK elections.  
 
3.2.1: Party Political Balance 
 
As previously noted, the Labour party achieved more appearances and 
quotation space than their political opponents in 2005 national election 
coverage. This difference was evident across all national media sectors. In 
the UK, newspapers are not required to provide the political parties with 
equivalent news-space, but these expectations are placed upon the 
broadcasters. Changes to the Representation of the People’s Act In 2000 
shifted the emphasis towards self-regulation by the broadcasters, with the 
expectation that ‘Over a reasonable period of time, a proper balance of 
different viewpoints is achieved’ (Home Office guidelines, 2001 quoted in 
Deacon et al., 2001: p.669). This begs the question whether these changes 
have produced an advantage to the incumbent party, at least in terms of 
media presence13.  
 
Table 3.3 compares party stopwatch balance data for the 1992, 2001 and 
2005 UK Elections14 in the UK national broadcast media (both in relation to 
the parties’ frequency of appearance and total quotation time).  
 
Table 3.3: A Comparison of The Proportional Appearance and Total 
Quotation Time of the Three Main Political Parties in National Broadcast 
coverage of the 1992, 2001 and 2005 UK General Elections 
 
 Quotation Time 
 1992 2001 2005
Labour 36 43.61702 41.30435
Conservative 41 38.29787 34.78261
Lib Dem 23 18.08511 23.91304
 Number of Appearances 
 1992 2001 2005
Labour 33.3975 41.30435 40
Conservative 41 38.04348 33.33333
Lib Dem 25.98653 20.65217 26.66667
 
The results show: 
 
• Any apparent advantage in broadcast quotation time for Labour in 2005 
was less than their lead in 2001 (41% compared to 44%). Their 
percentages of appearances were broadly similar for the two 
campaigns.  
 
                                                 
13 Of course it is not always the case that more media presence offers political advantage. There is also a need to 
consider the nature of coverage. 
14 Data for the 1997 are not available 
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• In 1992 the Conservative party, who were then in power, had higher 
levels of quotation time and appearances than their political opponents 
in national broadcast coverage. Moreover, these differences were 
almost exactly equivalent to those identified for Labour in 2005. 
 
• Although levels of coverage of the Conservative party in 2005 were 
down on those identified in 2001, it was the Liberal Democrats rather 
than Labour who have benefited from this reduction. However, their 
levels of national media exposure in 2005 were not unprecedented, 
being broadly equivalent to those achieved in the 1992 campaign.  
 
3.2.2: Trends in ‘Presidentialization’ 
 
Observations about the presidentialization of national election reporting have 
been a recurrent refrain over recent campaigns. Figure 3.3 compares the 
extent to which the main party leaders dominated media coverage for the last 
four UK General Elections. Interestingly, the results suggest that although the 
party leaders still command a very considerable presence, electoral coverage 
has become less leader-orientated on an election-by-election basis since 
1992.   
 
 
Notes: To ensure comparability across the different sample sets, these figures only relate to the three most 
prominently quoted party political sources in election related news coverage for the 1997, 2001 and 2005 General 
Election Campaigns. (In the 1997 analysis, only the three most prominent actors were coded) 
 
3.3: Beyond the Parties: Other Actors in Election Related Coverage 
 
Politicians are, of course, not the only interested parties in election 
campaigns. The onset of any election campaign also attracts contributions 
from many interest groups, citizens and public commentators who variously 
seek to influence and adjudicate upon the political contest at hand. Table 3.3 
lists the prominence of individuals and institutions not directly related to UK 
political parties across all national media sectors. 
 
Figure 3.3: Comparison of the Frequency of
Appearance of Main Party Leaders to All Other
Candidates (All National Media 1997 to 2005)
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Table 3.3: Comparison of the Presence of Non Party Political Actors in 
National Election News Coverage (4 April – 6 May 2005)  
 
 
All 
National 
Media Broadcast
Quality 
Press 
Mid 
Market 
Press 
Populist 
Press 
Non Party Actors % % % % % 
Politicians' Families 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 
Foreign Politicians 1 0.4 0.8 2.2 2.2 
Quangos15 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.2 
Media 3.2 6.9 1.7 1.9 1 
Pollsters 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 
Voluntary Sector 1 1.2 0.8 1.3 0.7 
Academic Sector 1.6 2.2 1.4 1.9 0.8 
Public Sector 3.1 2.2 3.6 5.1 1.6 
Corporate Sector 1.3 0.7 1.8 1.3 0.7 
Trade Union Sector 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Faith Communities 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Citizens 7.3 10.5 5.5 4.6 8.4 
Other 0.2 0.4 0 0.1 0 
Percentages=the percentage of all party political and non party political actors identified in coverage 
 
The following main points emerge: 
 
• Approximately 1 in 5 of the actors that appeared in election related 
news coverage were not directly linked to any of the political parties 
involved in the 2005 Election campaign. 
 
• Members of the public (‘Citizens’) were the most prominent category of 
non-party political actors across all national news sectors. Their relative 
prominence was greatest in National broadcast coverage (10.5% of all 
actors coded) and in the populist press (8.4%). 
 
• Journalists and other media-related actors were far more prominent in 
national Television coverage than any of the national press sectors 
(6.9% of all actors coded, compared with a range of 1 to 1.7 % for the 
national press). 
 
• Academic, corporate, voluntary and quasi-governmental sectors 
received low levels of coverage, but the most peripheral actors were 
Trade Unions and representatives from the faith communities.  
 
• Neither foreign politicians nor the families of UK politicians commanded 
any significant levels of national media attention16.   
 
 
                                                 
15 ‘Quangos’ = Executive and Advisory NDPBs, Non Ministerial Government Departments & Next Step Agencies 
16 The low percentage recorded for ‘politician’s family’ may seem surprising, given the news of the birth of Charles 
Kennedy’s baby during the early stages of the campaign and the regular appearance of Sandra Howard alongside 
her husband at Conservative campaign events. However, as explained earlier, to be coded as actors, individuals 
needed to have an active presence in a news item. Simply being pictured without being referred to, or being 
mentioned in an incidental way by a journalist, would not normally provide a sufficient basis for being coded as an 
actor.  
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3.3: The Gender Agenda 
 
In previous UK elections, concerns have been expressed about the gender 
imbalances in election reporting and the role these may play in entrenching, 
or even increasing, broader inequalities in political participation and 
representation.  When considering this matter, Joni Lovenduski highlights the 
need to differentiate between Women’s ‘issues’ and Women’s ‘perspectives’: 
 
‘Women’s issues are those that mainly affect women, either for 
biological reasons (such as breast cancer screening and reproductive 
rights) or for social reasons (sex equality or child-care policy). 
Women’s perspectives are women’s views on all political matters’ 
(2001: 745) 
 
In the 2005 campaign, ‘Women’s Issues’ barely registered on the national 
media agenda, with only 19 items (0.5 percent of all national election news 
coverage) making any substantial reference to them.  
 
Two measures were used to appraise the extent to which women’s 
perspectives were included in mainstream coverage: (a) the gender of the 
authors of election related items and (b) the gender of actors in coverage. 
 
Table 3.4 shows that men were far more likely to write or present election 
related coverage than women. Gender imbalances were most evident in the 
quality and mid market press, and least evident in broadcast coverage.  
 
Table 3.4: Gender of Authors of National Election Coverage 
 
All 
Media Broadcast 
Quality 
Press 
Mid 
Market 
Press 
Populist 
Press 
Female 23 29 19 19 24 
Male 77 71 82 81 76 
Notes: These data exclude instances of joint female/ male authorship and cases where the gender of the  author  
was unclear.    
 
Table 3.5 compares the proportion of male to female actors found in national 
election coverage for the 2001 and 2005 Elections.  
 
Table 3.5: Gender of Actors in National Election Coverage 
  Female Male 
 Row % Row % 
All Media 2001 14 86 
2005 14 86 
Broadcast 2001 16 84 
2005 17 83 
Quality Press 2001 12 88 
2005 14 86 
Mid Market Press 2001 14 86 
2005 13 87 
Populist Press 2001 16 84 
 2005 14 86 
Notes: These data exclude instances of joint female/ male authorship andcases where the gender of the  author  was unclear. 
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• Across all national media, male actors outnumbered females by a ratio 
of more than 6: 1 in national coverage of the 2005 election. 
 
• There was no significant variation between national media sectors as 
to the amount of coverage given to female actors. 
 
• Gender differences found for the 2005 campaign proved remarkably 
consistent with those identified in the 2001 Election.  
 
 
Table 3.6. breaks down the results of table 3.5 by ‘actor type’. 
 
Table 3.6: Gender of Actor by Actor Type (all National Media) 
 
 Females Males 
 (Row %) (Row %) 
Party Political 9 91 
Foreign Politician 9 91 
Politicians' Family 92 8 
Quangos 17 83 
Media 25 75 
Pollster 13 87 
Voluntary Sector 31 69 
Academic 9 91 
Public Sector 12 88 
Corporate Sector 5 95 
Trade Union Sector 0 100 
Faith Communities 0 100 
Citizens 45 55 
Military 22 78 
Notes: These data exclude instances of joint female/ male authorship 
and cases where the gender of the  author  was unclear. 
 
The following main points emerge: 
 
• The gender gap for coverage of politicians (whether domestic or 
foreign) was even more accentuated (91 percent to 9 percent). In both 
cases, male politicians appeared ten times more frequently than their 
female colleagues. 
 
• This differential considerably exceeds broader inequalities in the British 
parliamentary system17.  
 
• Across most of the other categories, male presence considerably 
exceeded female presence (see in particular the results for ‘faith 
communities’, ‘corporate sector’, ‘Trade Unions’ and ‘Academic sector’) 
 
                                                 
17 18 Percent of MPs in the UK are female (see http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/Campaign_Politics.htm) 
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• The only actor category where females and males achieved a near 
parity of presence was that of ‘citizens’ (i.e. lay members of society).  
Although, even here, males appeared 10 percent more frequently than 
females. 
• The only category where female presence exceeded male presence 
was that of ‘politicians’ family’ 
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Section 4: Agenda Balance – Themes in National Media Coverage of the 
Election 
 
This section examines the interpretative aspects of national media coverage 
of the 2005 General Election – i.e. what were the most prominent topics of 
election related news coverage during the sample period? 18   
 
Tables 4.1 presents the main and secondary themes in national media 
coverage.  
 
Table 4.1: Top 10 Main and Secondary Themes in National Media 
Coverage by Media Sector 
 
 All Media %  National 
Broadcast 
% Up Market 
Press 
% Mid Market
Press 
% Populist 
Press 
%
1 Electoral 
Process 
44 Electoral 
Process 
42 Electoral 
Process 
49 Electoral 
Process 
28 Electoral 
Process 
46
2 Political 
Propriety 
8 Iraq 10 Iraq 8 Political 
Impropriety 
17 Political 
Impropriety 
6
3 Iraq 8 Asylum/ 
Immigration
8 Political 
Impropriety 
7 Iraq 10 NHS 6
4 Asylum/ 
Immigration 
7 Political 
Impropriety 
8 Asylum/ 
Immigration
6 Asylum/ 
Immigration
9 Crime 6
5 Taxation 5 Crime 4 Taxation 5 Taxation 7 Asylum/ 
Immigration
6
6 NHS 4 NHS 4 Economy 4 NHS 7 Education 
 
5
7 Crime 4 Taxation 4 Education 3 Crime 5 Economy 
 
5
8 Economy 4 Education 3 NHS 3 Education 4 Iraq  
 
4
9 Education 3 Economy 2 Crime  2 Social 
Security 
4 Social 
Security 
4
10 Social 
Security 
2 Social 
Security 
2 Europe 2 Economy 3 Taxation 4
. 
 
The following main points emerge: 
 
• Coverage of the electoral process itself (i.e. the actions, strategies and 
prospects of the participants) was the most prominent topic in election 
coverage by a considerable margin. Table 3 breaks this category down 
further and shows that the main issues in this grouping concerned (a) 
                                                 
18 If necessary, three items could be coded for each election related news item: one Main theme and up to two 
subsidiary themes.  Where more than three themes were evident in a story, the three most prominent themes were 
coded. These judgements were made according to the following criteria:  
 
a. The amount of space discussion of the theme occupies in the article (whether measured in seconds or column 
cms). 
b. The prominence given to a theme in an article.  
c. The use of headlines or studio intro leads to flag the most salient topics of the piece. 
 
We were not interested in coding subtle, imputed or passing references made by journalists, or the sources they 
quote, to potential themes. To be coded, a theme had to occupy at least TWO FULL SENTENCES in a printed 
article, or 10 SECONDS of broadcast time. 
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open discussion of the parties’ campaigning strategies (19 percent of 
all themes) and (b) opinion poll and focus group evidence (8 percent). 
 
• ‘Political Improprieties’, ‘Iraq’ & ‘Asylum and Immigration’ were the next 
most prominent themes in UK National media coverage. There then 
follows a sharp tail-off in the prominence of other themes further down 
the list. When added together, the categories of ‘Taxation’, ‘Education’, 
‘Crime’, ‘the Economy’, ‘NHS’ and ‘Social Security’ amount to just 19% 
of the total themes coded. 
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Table 4.2: Top 5 Sub Themes Within the ‘Electoral Process’ Theme 
Category (UK National Media Only) 
 
 Percent 
Discussion of Campaigning Strategies 19% 
Opinion Polls, Focus Groups, ‘Horse Race’ 8% 
Passing references to the chosen daily topic 
agendas of political parties 
3% 
Political tensions and infighting within Parties & 
defections 
2% 
Party Spin/ PR/ News Management 2% 
All other themes in this category 10% 
 
Notes: These sub theme percentages are percentages of all the themes coded (i.e. they add up to 44%). 
 
• There are many themes absent from the list that were to prove 
considerably newsworthy in the immediate aftermath of the campaign. 
These included:  
 
a. Debates about the future of the EU constitution and the financial 
structure of the EU  (during the election period, ‘Europe’ only 
accounted for 1.3 percent of coded themes). 
 
b. The prospect for the peace process in Northern Ireland in the wake 
of the rise of the Democratic Unionist Party and the IRA’s declared 
cessation of armed activity (during the campaign, ‘Northern Ireland’ 
accounted for 0.6 percent of all coded themes). 
 
c. Radical proposals for taxing car usage as a means of alleviating 
chronic road congestion (during the campaign, ‘Transport’ accounted 
for 0.3 percent of all coded themes). 
 
d. Attempts by the UK government to secure international compliance 
to the Kyoto agreement as a means of tackling global warming (during 
the campaign, ‘the Environment’ accounted for 1.4 percent of all coded 
themes). 
 
e. Plans for reducing international debt among developing nations 
(during the campaign, ‘Foreign Policy [aside from Iraq]’ accounted for 
0.4 percent of coverage).  
 
f. Concerns about the threat posed by terrorism and how to deal with it 
(‘Terrorism policy’ accounted for 0.2 percent of all coded themes)  
 
• There was some variation in the prominence of themes across different 
national media sectors.  Most noticeably, the categories ‘Political 
Improprieties’ and ‘Asylum and Immigration’ were far more evident in 
the Mid Market newspapers’ coverage compared with all other national 
media sectors.  
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• Iraq was conspicuously less prominent in ‘Populist’ press coverage. 
(4.5 percent of the themes coded for The Sun concerned Iraq, 
compared with 4.7 percent for the Daily Mirror and 1.2 percent for The 
Star). With The Star the absence of coverage is reflective of a general 
disengagement with covering the political substance of the campaign.  
The Sun’s relative inattention to the issue may at least be partially 
explained by its enduring support for the Government’s actions in 
invading Iraq. (This stance was reiterated in several of its election 
editorials).  The Daily Mirror’s relative neglect of the issue is perhaps 
more intriguing, given its trenchant criticisms of the government’s 
actions on Iraq during 2003-4.   
 
• Table 4.3 breaks down the category of ‘political improprieties’ into sub-
themes. In all national media sectors, the most common set of issues 
in this category related to the personal integrity and trustworthiness of 
candidates, and the dominant focus of this debate was the Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair. The Mid Market press paid more attention to 
concerns about the integrity of the new postal voting arrangements 
than other National UK media. These titles also gave higher levels of 
coverage to debates about the Prime Minister’s personal integrity 
(more than 1 in 10 of all the themes coded in national mid Market press 
coverage concerned this matter). 
 
Table 4.3: Sub Themes within the ‘Political Impropriety’ Category Theme 
Category (Main and Secondary) by UK National Media 
 
 TV 
Up 
Market 
Press 
Mid 
Market 
Press 
Populist 
Press 
‘Concerns about Postal voting by demand’ 2.2 2.6 4.7 1.5
 ‘Other Electoral Fraud concerns’  0.1 
 ‘Integrity of leaders – questions of trust - Labour’ 5.3 3.6 10.4 2.0
 ‘Integrity of leaders – questions of trust - Cons’  0.2 0.1 0.7
 ‘Integrity of leaders – questions of trust - LibDem’  0.1  
 ‘Integrity of leaders – questions of trust - Other’  0.1 
 ‘Integrity of leaders – questions of trust – Various’ 0.1  0.4
‘Integrity of other politicians – questions of trust -Labour’  0.5 0.2
 ‘Integrity of other politicians – questions of trust -Cons’ 0.1 0.4
 ‘Integrity of other politicians – questions of trust -LibDem’  
 ‘Integrity of other politicians – questions of trust -Other’  
‘Integrity of other politicians – questions of trust – Various’ 0.2 0.3 
‘Sexual exploits of politicians’ 0.1 0.2 0.7
 ‘Other issues concerning standards corruption scandals sleaze’ 0.1 0.2 0.2
 
Notes:  These sub theme percentages are percentages of all the themes coded. All Percentages are rounded to 1 
decimal point 
 
• The prominence of these particular themes varied considerably during 
the campaign period. Figure 4.1 shows the week-by-week prominence 
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of the top three substantive themes found in the election coverage 
analysed (respectively, ‘Political Improprieties’, ‘Iraq’ and ‘Immigration 
& Asylum’). The salience of ‘Iraq’ and ‘Immigration & Asylum’ increased 
greatly towards the latter stages of the campaign. After the third week 
‘Asylum & Immigration’ issues fell away from prominence.  
 
 
 
 
4.2: Policy versus Process 
 
It is often claimed that election reporting is more concerned with reporting the 
process rather than substance of a campaign19. The marked dominance of 
coverage of the conduct of the election itself during the 2005 Campaign 
seems to lend weight to this interpretation, and is consistent with trends 
identified in previous UK general elections (see Billig et al., 1992; Deacon et 
al., 1997 and Deacon et al., 2001).  
 
To interrogate more closely the relative balance of ‘policy’ and ‘process’ 
coverage during the 2005 campaign we applied an ordinal scale to appraise 
(a) which items contained information about substantive policy issues and 
choices, and (b) the extent of this descriptive material relative to the overall 
length of the item. The results are presented in figure 4.2. 
 
                                                 
19 For example,  in the 2001 campaign, Tony Blair lamented the national media’s failure to deal with ‘real issues’ and 
Alistair Campbell criticised  journalists’ obsession with ‘policy rather than process’ (Deacon et al, 2001: 670) 
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The results show that: 
 
• The majority of items in all national media sectors contained either no 
or negligible descriptive policy-related information (i.e. this content 
constituted less than 4 percent of the entire length of the item). 
 
• The broadcast media produced a higher proportion of items containing 
at least some descriptive policy information than all sections of the 
national press. 
 
There were no major differences between national press sectors in the extent 
of their policy reporting. (37 percent of broadcast items contained some policy 
description, compared with 24 percent of the ‘quality’ press, 23 percent of the 
‘mid market’ press, and 22 percent of the ‘populist’ press). 
Figure 4.2: Policy Content in National Press  
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Section 5: Directional Balance in National Media Coverage 
 
 ‘Directional balance’ is the most contentious and problematic aspect of media 
coverage to assess, as it relates to the political evaluations made by news 
producers about political actors and issues. In popular terms, this is 
commonly referred to as ‘bias’, but this is a term we prefer to avoid, firstly 
because of the implicit accusations of cynicism and un-professionalism that it 
evokes, and secondly because of the assumption that there is some 
completely value neutral position from which the media accounts, wittingly or 
unwittingly, depart.  
 
We used two measures to assess directional balance across the media 
sample. The first was used in relation to the thematic categories described in 
section 4. Each time a theme was identified an ‘adjectival’ code was attached 
to it that indicated whether the theme: 
 
• Was mainly or solely ‘Good News’ for a particular political party 
• Was mainly or solely ‘Bad News’ for a particular political party 
• Had both negative and positive implications for a particular political 
party (‘mixed News’) 
• Had no clear evaluative implications for a particular political party, 
whether positive or negative (‘Descriptive News’) 
• Was either ‘Good News’, ‘Bad News’, ‘Mixed News’ or ‘Descriptive 
News’ for more than one particular party, or for politicians in general 
 
The second measure for directional balance involved applying a further 
adjectival code to each political actor identified in election coverage. These 
codes indicated whether the reported actor was: 
 
• Mainly or solely describing or presenting their policies and opinions 
• Mainly or solely defending themselves from attack from their political 
opponents 
• Mainly or solely attacking the views, actions or policies of others 
 
An additional code was also included for those occasions where it was not 
possible to attribute any of the above to the actions or views of a reported 
actor (‘no stance’)20. 
 
In our view, this close attention to the evaluative aspects of the components of 
a news story provides a much more detailed, reliable and valid measure of 
directional balance, not least because it corresponds more closely to the 
discursive features of news reports, in which views and issues are often 
deliberately juxtaposed and it is not always possible to discern any single, 
unitary narrative strand.  
 
                                                 
20 Adept politicians will often seek to do several or all of these things in an individual media appearance. Therefore, it 
was often necessary to make an on-balance judgement between these choices. To do so, the coding team 
concentrated on identifying the initial reason for an actor’s inclusion in an item.  
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5.1: Bad News for Whom? The Directional Implications of National News 
Themes 
 
Table 5.1 presents the results from the adjectival codes linked to the themes 
identified in news coverage.  
 
The following main points emerge: 
 
Table 5.1: Directional Trends in National News Themes  
 
  
All 
Media 
Broad-
cast 
Quality 
Press 
Mid 
Market 
Press 
Populist 
Press 
  
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
Labour Good News 6.3 2.4 5.5 1.0 20.9
 Bad News 18.8 9.9 17.6 61.2 9.8
 Mixed 16.9 18.8 18.4 8.8 14.3
 Descriptive 3.5 1.8 3.7 2.3 7.0
Conservative Good News 3.0 1.5 3.0 7.0 3.1
 Bad News 6.7 3.4 7.2 1.3 15.9
 Mixed 6 9.4 5.8 2.8 2.0
 Descriptive 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.5 0.9
Lib Dem Good News 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.2
 Bad News 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.3 3.7
 Mixed 2.2 4.1 1.8 0.3 0.9
 Descriptive 1.1 1.8 0.7 0.5 1.1
Other Party Good News 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0
 Bad News 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.7
 Mixed 1.1 2.2 0.9 0.3 0.2
 Descriptive 0.9 2.1 0.5 0 0.2
All/ Several Parties Good News 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.2
 Bad News 1.7 1.5 2 0.8 1.7
 Mixed 22.9 31.8 23.3 10.0 12
 Descriptive 5.1 7.0 4.8 1.0 5.0
 
Notes: All figures are rounded to 1 decimal point. Percentage totals may not add up to 100. 
 
• A remarkably high proportion of the themes reported in the mid market 
national press had negative implications for the Labour Party (61 
percent) and only a very small minority had any positive implications (1 
percent). However, this emphasis on ‘bad news for Labour’ did not 
translate into much coverage of ‘Good News for the Conservatives’ (7 
percent). 
 
• In the populist press, there were higher levels of ‘Good News for 
Labour’ (20.9 percent) and the extent of ‘bad news’ for the 
Conservatives exceeded that for Labour (15.9 percent compared with 
9.8 percent). 
 
• In the coverage of the ‘quality’ press and broadcast media themes 
more frequently displayed ‘mixed’ or ‘general’ implications (that is to 
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say, they raised positive and negative issues, or were not associated 
directly with any single political party). 
 
• Themes related to the Liberal Democrats were most evident in the 
broadcast media and populist media sectors. In the former case, few of 
the themes addressed unequivocally positive or negative implications 
for the party. In the populist press, however, the largest Lib Democrat 
related category focused upon the ‘bad news’ aspect. 
 
5.2: The Stance of Political Actors in National News Coverage 
 
Table 5.2 provides an overview the results of the second measure of 
directional balance concerning the stances of the political actors in coverage. 
 
Table 5.2: Party Political Actors Presenting, Defending & Attacking, in 
National Media Coverage  
 
  Labour Conservative Lib Dem Other  
All Media present 41% 30% 40% 56%
 defence 21% 12% 5% 3%
 attack 22% 44% 40% 21%
 no stance 16% 14% 15% 20%
 
The following main points emerge: 
 
• Labour actors more frequently appeared in a defensive stance 
than their opponents. The Liberal Democrats were the least 
defensive in their appearances. 
• Labour and Liberal Democrat actors were more frequently 
reported presenting their policies than the Conservatives. 
• Conservative party actors were twice as likely to be presented 
attacking their opponents than Labour.  
• The Liberal Democrats also displayed a more aggressive 
posture than Labour, which may seem surprising in light of 
Charles Kennedy’s claimed aversion to negative campaigning. 
Two points need to be borne in mind here. Firstly, this high 
percentage figure is in part due to the marginalization of the 
Liberal Democrats in a lot of coverage (particularly press 
coverage). Put simply, there was not always a lot of room for 
them to present themselves in a more constructive manner. 
Secondly, these raw figures do not capture the evident 
qualitative differences in the nature of the attacks being made by 
the main parties. (Disdaining the negativity of other parties’ 
campaigning is itself a political attack.) 
Table 5.3 disaggregates the data in Table 5.2 by national media sector.  
 
The results show: 
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Table 5.3: The Stance of Party Political Actors by National Media Sector 
 
  Labour Conservative Lib Dem Other  
Broadcast Presentation 35% 35% 47% 63%
 Defence 26% 11% 6% 3%
 Attack 21% 37% 35% 16%
 No Clear Stance 17% 17% 12% 18%
  Labour Conservative Lib Dem Other  
Quality Press Presentation 44% 30% 36% 55%
 Defence 18% 12% 3% 3%
 Attack 22% 45% 45% 24%
 No Clear Stance 16% 14% 16% 18%
  Labour Conservative Lib Dem Other  
Mid Market Press Presentation 27% 23% 15% 0%
 Defence 38% 3% 7% 0%
 Attack 22% 68% 74% 67%
 No Clear Stance 13% 6% 4% 33%
  Labour Conservative Lib Dem Other  
Populist Press Presentation 48% 26% 31% 11%
 Defence 13% 21% 11% 0%
 Attack 24% 42% 29% 44%
 No Clear Stance 16% 12% 29% 44%
Notes: Percentages= Column percentages for each media category 
 
 
• Levels of ‘presentation’ for all parties were greatest in the broadcast 
sector (with the sole exception of ‘Labour Presentation’ in the populist 
press sector). 
 
• Although Conservative actors were uniformly more attacking than 
defensive in their stance across all sectors, the difference between 
these measures varied. In the Mid Market press coverage their ‘attack’ 
exceeded ‘defence’ by 65 percent, in the populist press and the 
broadcast media the difference was 21 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively. 
 
5.3: National Press Partisanship 2005 
All data presented thus far in this section relate to directional balance in all 
forms of editorial content in the national news media. It is also pertinent in this 
context to consider the partisan editorial declarations of the national press 
during the 2005 campaign. 
Table 5.4 compares the final political declarations of all daily and weekly 
newspapers in the 2005 campaign with that of the 2001 election. A total of 
eight papers in 2005 endorsed Labour compared with six papers supporting 
the Conservatives and three, the Liberal Democrats. The corresponding 
figures for 2001 were 12 for Labour, for the Tories and none for the Liberal 
democrats. Translated into circulation terms, Labour’s percentage of the daily 
press support reduced from 72 percent to 57 percent. 
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The major reason for this nominal redistribution of party allegiances was the 
repositioning of the Express Group newspaper titles (Daily Express, Sunday 
Express, Daily Star and Daily Star on Sunday). These titles were purchased in 
2000 in highly controversial circumstances by Richard Desmond (publisher of 
a string of consumer, leisure and Adult magazines). In 2001 all these papers 
backed Labour. By 2005, both Express titles had switched to the 
Conservatives and The Star and Star on Sunday had decided not to declare 
for any political party.  
 
Table 5.4: Editorial Declarations of the National Press in 2005 UK 
General Election 
 2001  2005  
Daily Press  Circulation  Circulation 
The Guardian Labour 0.40 Labour  0.34  
The Independent Anti 
Conservative 
0.23  Lib Dem 0.23 
The Times Labour 0.71 Labour 0.65 
The Telegraph Conservative 1.02 Conservative 0.87 
The Financial Times Labour 0.49 Labour 0.38 
The Daily Express Labour 0.96 Conservative 0.87 
The Daily Mail Anti Labour 2.40  Conservative 2.30  
The Sun Labour 3.45 Labour 3.26 
The Mirror Labour 2.79 Labour 2.29 
The Star Labour 0.60 No Preference  0.85  
Sunday Press      
The Observer Labour 0.45 Labour 0.42 
Independent on Sunday Anti Labour 
Landslide 
0.25  Lib Dem  0.18 
The Sunday Times Labour 1.37 Conservative 1.35 
The Sunday Telegraph Conservative 0.79 Conservative 0.65 
The Mail on Sunday Conservative 2.33 Anti Labour 2.37 
The Sunday Express Labour 0.90 Conservative 0.84 
The Sunday Mirror Labour 1.87 Labour 1.53 
The News of the World Labour 3.90 Labour 3.64 
The People Labour  Labour 1.37 
 
However, these figures potentially obscure more than they reveal, as viewing 
party affiliations in these crude, categorical terms reveal nothing about their 
strength. Just as commentators have identified the need to think of votes cast 
‘as though they are somewhere along a continuum from having definitely 
decided not to vote for a party to having decided not to vote for a party at all’ 
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(Norris et al, 2001: 160), so press allegiances to their party of choice can 
range from convinced and staunch advocacy to the most hesitant of 
endorsements, or indeed a reluctance to declare for any party at all.  When 
we apply this consideration to a qualitative overview of newspaper allegiances 
in 2005, a different picture emerges of the strength and direction of their 
political support.  
 
5.3.1: The Strength of Party Affiliations 
 
In many of the election editorials the support expressed for chosen political 
parties was qualified and circumspect. Only the Sunday Telegraph, 
Telegraph, Daily Express, Sunday Express and the Daily Mirror gave anything 
resembling a resounding endorsement of their party of choice. In part, the 
reservations and qualifications of other papers derived from an appreciation of 
the quality and legitimacy of more than one party. For example, although The 
Independent had many positive things to say about Charles Kennedy and the 
Liberal Democrats, and eventually recommended ‘an outcome in which there 
is a significantly larger force of Liberal Democrat MPs’, their editorial stated ‘it 
would be too simplistic for The Independent to argue for a blanket 
endorsement of the Liberal Democrats at this election.’ Amidst an excoriating 
attack on the Prime Minister over Iraq and civil liberties, the paper conceded 
that his government ‘has been admirably liberal on social matters’ and that 
‘Britain has changed for the better under his watch, becoming a more modern, 
inclusive country’ (Independent 4/5/05).  The Guardian and Observer, too, 
seemed caught in the gravitational pull between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, eventually recommending Labour but welcoming the prospect of a 
strengthened presence for the Liberal Democrats (‘Voters with sitting Liberal 
Democrat MPs should return them.’ Observer, 1 May 2005; ‘Voters should 
use their heads and hearts to re-elect Labour with an increased Liberal 
Democrat presence’ The Guardian, 4 May 2005). The Times, meanwhile, in a 
comparatively upbeat endorsement of Labour, acknowledged the appeal of 
the Conservatives manifesto in many areas and concluded ‘The best result for 
Britain, we think, would be a smaller but viable Labour majority and a larger 
and renewed Tory opposition’ (The Times, 3 May 2005). 
 
In some of the editorials, the hesitant tone was linked to significant 
reservations about the record and manifesto of their chosen party. For 
example, The News of the World declared ‘our first message is: Vote on 
Thursday. And our second is: Vote for Labour. We have thrown our weight 
behind Tony Blair's party. But not without some apprehension… If, as we 
expect, Labour form the next government we put them on notice this 
newspaper will be watching them closely.’ (1 May 2005). This line was also 
evident in the editorialising of its sister paper, The Sun. At the start of the 
campaign, the Sun announced it had not made up its mind as to who it would 
support, but by the second week had decided ‘Tony Blair –warts and all – will 
be the only real choice for Britain on May 5’ (21 April 2005). But this was 
presented as ‘one last chance’ and the paper set out at considerable length 
their political differences and disappointment with the government in many 
policy areas.  
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Another stated reason for some papers’ equivocation, was a cold and 
pragmatic assessment of the electoral prospects of their preferred choices. 
This was most evident in newspapers that expressed most sympathy with the 
Liberal Democrats, epitomized by the Independent on Sunday’s conclusion 
that ‘Where the realistic choice is between Labour and Conservative, we 
prefer Labour, but the values for which this newspaper stands are best 
promoted “where they can win” for the Liberal Democrats’ (1 May 2005). 
 
This appeal to tactical voting reveals what was by far the most common 
reason for newspapers’ muted endorsement of one or more party: their 
antagonism towards the alternatives on offer. For, if some of the papers were 
subdued in their recommendations, they were certainly vehement in their 
declamations. For example, The Daily Mail, in outlining its support for the 
Conservatives commented  
 
‘The Tories may still seem something of a one-man band. But at least they 
offer the hope of restoring integrity to public life, of renegotiating more 
sensible terms with Europe, of restoring genuine prudence to the economy 
and re-energising the public sector…Yet if we're being honest, our support for 
a Conservative victory - which we concede is unlikely - is superseded by an 
even greater imperative: to diminish the power of an overweeningly arrogant 
Mr Blair and restore a healthy democracy to this country.’ 
 
 
This ‘disdain for the other’ was also widely evident among newspapers on the 
centre and centre-left. The Guardian’s  reservations about any switch of 
support from Labour to the Liberal Democrats was in no small part based on 
their adamant view that The Conservative party was ‘the worst answer to what 
is wrong with Britain… It is vital to stop the Conservatives’ (4 May 2005). The 
People recognised that  ‘There is much for Labour voters to be unhappy 
about’, but warned that the consequences would be ‘unthinkable’ should 
Michael Howard and his party ‘slither through the back door’. In less alarmist 
terms, the Financial Times stated   
 
‘There are good reasons for the nation’s disenchantment with Mr Blair 
– not least the loss of trust resulting from the Iraq war and his 
shambolically informal style of government. But Mr Howard’s 
Conservatives do not look like a convincing alternative. It is not yet time 
for a change’ (3 May 2005). 
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Section 6: Election Coverage in Scotland, Wales and the East Midlands 
 
This section compares the trends identified in UK wide election reporting with 
coverage produced in more specific national and regional contexts 
(respectively, Wales, Scotland & The East Midlands of England21).  
 
6.1: Stop Watch Balance 
 
Table 6.1 compares the prominence of Party Political Actors across the 
different sampled regions. The following main points emerge: 
 
Table 6.1: Frequency of Appearance of Political Actors by Media Region 
 
UK 
National 
Media 
Welsh 
Media 
Scottish 
Media 
East 
Midlands
Tony.Blair 16 5 10 11 
Labour MP 26 19 26 13 
Labour Other 6 10 4 13 
Michael Howard 11 5 8 9 
Conservative MP 8 5 3 4 
Conservative Other 11 15 14 16 
Charles Kennedy 6 4 5 9 
Liberal Democrat MP 2 2 3 1 
Liberal Democrat Other 8 13 11 14 
Alex Salmond 0.4 0.3 5 0 
other SNP 0.3 0 5 0 
Ieuan Wyn Jones 0 1 0 0 
Other Plaid Cymru 0.4 13 0.1 0 
Ulster Unionist 0.3 1 0.1 0 
DUP 0.3 0 0.1 0.2 
Sinn Fein 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 
Social Democrats and Labour 0.2 0 0 0 
Respect 0.8 0.5 1 1 
BNP 0.2 0 0 0.5 
Greens 0.3 0.5 1 1.3 
UKIP 0.5 1 0.2 3 
Veritas 0.3 0.3 0.1 3 
Scottish Socialists 0.1 0.2 1 0 
Other politician 1 5 1 1 
Notes: All Percentages above 0.51 are rounded to the nearest full number. Percentages 0.5 and below are rounded 
to 1 decimal point. 
 
• Plaid Cymru and the Scottish Nationalist Party gained far more 
prominence, respectively, in the Welsh and Scottish News Media than 
they did in the UK wide media.  
                                                 
21 The East Midlands was selected as our local media sample, because it 
contained many of the key marginal seats that determined the national 
outcome. 
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• The leaders of the main political parties tended to attract lower levels of 
coverage in Welsh, Scottish and East Midlands coverage. The one 
exception was coverage of Charles Kennedy in the East Midlands, 
where his proportional presence exceeded levels found in national 
coverage. 
 
• The other minor parties were comparably  marginalised across all four 
sectors. It is noticeable, however, that UKIP and Veritas achieved more 
coverage in the East Midlands (3 percent each)22.  
 
• MPs were the most frequently coded actors for the Labour party, 
across all four media categories. With Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat party appearances, however, other party actors commanded 
most coverage (i.e. local councillors and other party activists)   
 
• Figure 6.1 compares the distribution of actors’ appearances of the 5 
most frequently reported parties. The results show that Labour 
achieved most appearances across all media categories, but that their 
prominence was less evident in Welsh, Scottish and East Midlands 
coverage.  
Figure 6.1: Proportion of Main Party 
Appearances by Media Region
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Table 6.2 compares the gender balance in election reporting in UK wide 
media with those in other national regional and regional media. Once again, 
men dominated the show. The under-representation of women was worst in 
Scottish coverage, and although the female presence was slightly greater in 
Welsh and East Midland’s coverage, women still only accounted for 1 in 5 of 
the actors identified.  
Table 6.2: Gender of Actors in Media Sectors 
 
All UK 
Media 
Welsh 
Media 
Scottish 
Media 
East 
Midlands 
Media 
Female 14 20 13 22
Male 86 80 87 79
                                                 
22 This can be largely explained by the presence of Robert Kilroy Silk as an election candidate 
in the region 
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Note: As percentages are rounded, totals may exceed 100 
 
6.2: Agenda Balance 
 
Table 6.3 compares the most prominent themes found in Welsh, Scottish and 
East Midlands election coverage. The following main points emerge:  
 
6.3: Top Ten Themes by Media Region 
 
 All UK 
Media 
%  Welsh Media % Scottish 
Media 
% East 
Midlands 
Media 
% 
1 Electoral 
Process 
50 Electoral 
Process 
49
 
Electoral 
Process 
44 Electoral 
Process 
52 
2 Iraq 8 NHS 8 Political 
Impropriety 
9 NHS 7 
3 Political 
Impropriety 
6 Political 
Impropriety 
6 Iraq 9 Crime 6 
4 Asylum/ 
Immigration 
6 Constitutional 
Issues 
5 Asylum/ 
Immigration 
6 Asylum/ 
Immigration 
6 
5 Taxation 4 Iraq 5 Constitutional 
Issues 
5 Iraq 4 
6 NHS 4 Local Govt 4 NHS 4 Education 3 
7 Crime 3 Education 3 Economy 4 Political 
Impropriety 
3 
8 Education 3 Economy 3 Taxation 
 
4 Taxation 3 
9 Economy 3 Social 
Security 
2 Social 
Security 
3 Economy 2 
10 Social 
Security 
2 Taxation 2 Other 
Military/ 
Defence  
1 Social 
Security 
2 
 
• Levels of coverage of the electoral process were similarly high to those 
found in UK wide news and current affairs coverage. Levels were 
highest in the East Midlands (50 percent) and lowest in Scotland (44 
percent). 
 
• There was some degree of independence in the interpretative agendas 
of these other national and regional media. In Welsh coverage, ‘the 
NHS’ was the second most prominent theme category and ‘local 
government’ was sixth on the list (the latter category did not appear as 
a top ten issue in any other context). ‘Asylum/ Immigration’ did not 
make the top ten themes in this context, unlike all other media 
categories (The issue was the 4th  most prominent theme in Scottish, 
East Midlands and UK wide media coverage). In the East Midlands, 
‘the NHS’ and ‘Crime’ were the second and third most frequently 
reported themes. Finally, ‘Constitutional Issues’ attracted higher levels 
of attention in the Welsh and Scottish Media. (These matters did not 
make the top ten themes for either UK wide or East Midlands media.) 
 
Table 6.4 breaks down the macro-category of ‘Constitutional Issues’ into its 
component elements. The results show that coverage of these issues in both 
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Wales and Scotland concentrated predominantly upon the responsibilities and 
operations of their respective legislative bodies (the Welsh Assembly and the 
Scottish Parliament). More general or abstract constitutional matters received 
scant attention (matching their marginal presence in national media debates). 
 
Table 6.4: Comparison of Specific Constitutional Issues in Welsh and 
Scottish Election Coverage 
 
 Welsh 
Media 
Scottish 
Media 
‘Electoral boundary concerns or issues’ 0.3 % 1.3% 
‘Voting reform’ 0.2% 0.4% 
‘Welsh assembly – operation/ responsibilities’ 4.4% 0.1% 
‘Scottish Parliament – operation/ responsibilities’ - 3.1% 
‘Other Devolution issues’ 0.2% 0.1% 
‘Reform of parliament’ - 0.1% 
  
6.3: Directional Balance 
 
Table 6.5 presents the results of a comparison of the first measure of 
directional balance discussed in section 5  by media region  (i.e. the adjectival 
codes applied to the themes identified in election coverage). 
 
 
Table 6.5: Directional Trends in National News Themes  
 
   
All UK 
Media 
Welsh 
Media 
Scottish 
Media 
East 
Midlands 
Media 
    
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
% of all 
Themes 
Labour Good News 6.3 1.4 5.4 3.7
  Bad News 18.8 9.9 8.6 5.6
  Mixed 16.9 18.2 21.1 8.6
  Descriptive 3.5 1.4 2.7 0.7
Conservative Good News 3 0.2 0.4 1.3
  Bad News 6.7 3.9 7.4 0.7
  Mixed 6 5.8 4 9.1
  Descriptive 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.3
Lib Dem Good News 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.5
  Bad News 1 0 1 0
  Mixed 2.2 2.8 2.1 4.9
  Descriptive 1.1 1.4 2.1 0.8
Other Party Good News 0.1 1.4 0 0.5
  Bad News 0.8 0.5 2.1 0.2
  Mixed 1.1 1.6 3 1.7
  Descriptive 0.9 1.8 3.3 0.7
All/ Several Parties Good News 0.4 0 0 1
  Bad News 1.7 2.5 3.6 0.3
  Mixed 22.9 39.6 26.2 45.5
  Descriptive 5.1 5.5 4.3 12
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The following main points emerge from this comparison: 
 
• In Wales and the East Midlands coverage tended to focus more upon the 
mixed political implications of issues for more than one political party. In 
Scotland, there was more discussion of the mixed implications of reported 
issues for the Labour Party. 
 
• Across all three sample regions, levels of ‘bad news for Labour’ were far 
lower than those identified in UK wide news coverage. However, levels of 
‘good news for Labour’ were also comparatively lower. 
 
• Levels of ‘bad news for the Conservative party’ in Scotland exceeded 
those found for all other media sectors. 
 
Table 6.6 provides the results of the second test of directional balance 
discussed in section 5  (i.e. the distribution of the reported stances of political 
actors featured in news coverage.) 
 
The following main points emerge from this comparison: 
  
Table 6. 6: Stance of Political Actors by Media Region 
 
  Labour Cons Lib Dem SNP 
Plaid 
Cymru Other 
UK Present 41% 30% 40% 69% 82% 52% 
 Defence 21% 12% 5% 3% - 3% 
 Attack 22% 44% 40% 24% 12% 22% 
 no stance 15% 14% 14% 3% 6% 23% 
        
Welsh Present 53% 46% 61% 100% 36% 57% 
 defence 10% 12% 8% - 4% 5% 
 attack 27% 32% 13% - 49% 26% 
 no stance 10% 10% 18% - 12% 12% 
        
Scottish present 50% 34% 50% 49% - 67% 
 defence 13% 9% 4% 5% - - 
 attack 29% 52% 39% 45% 100% 23% 
 no stance 8% 5% 7% 1% - 10% 
        
East Midlands present 66% 65% 62% - - 55% 
 defence 7% 5% 7% - - 4% 
 attack 13% 18% 14% - - 14% 
 no stance 15% 11% 17% - - 26% 
 
 
• Labour actors were most frequently presented in a presentational 
stance across all media sectors. However, their stance was less 
defensive in Scottish and East Midlands’ coverage compared with UK 
wide coverage, and more aggressive in Wales and Scotland. 
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• The stance of Conservative actors is Wales was less aggressive in 
Welsh Media, compared with UK wide and Scottish Media (i.e. they 
were most frequently reported in a presentational mode). 
 
• In Welsh coverage, Plaid Cymru were more frequently reported as 
attacking others than presenting their positions and policies (49 
percent: 36%). In Scotland, the SNP ‘presented’ more than ‘attacked’ 
(39 percent: 50 percent) 
 
• Political actors from all the main parties were more frequently reported 
in a presenting role than either attacking or defending in East Midlands 
coverage. 
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Chapter 2: Politics as an Appearance and Reality Show 
 
Professor Michael Billig 
 
Public opinion polls show politicians to be among the least trusted profession 
in contemporary Britain. Regardless of the precise questions asked, a fairly 
consistent pattern of distrust has been revealed in the past few years. A MORI 
poll, conducted in July 2003 found that 75 percent of the adult population 
claimed that they would not trust politicians. According to the British Social 
Attitudes Survey of 2001 only eleven percent of the population said they 
trusted politicians to tell the truth most of the time. An ICM poll, conducted in 
March 2005, just before the General Election, revealed that 87 percent of 
respondents believed that politicians did not keep their promises, while 92 
percent said that politicians never gave "a straight answer". Also, 73 percent 
of respondents said politicians had shown themselves to be dishonest too 
often. 
 
The electorate express suspicion of politicians as a class, whether 
government or oppositional. The MORI poll of 2003 revealed that very similar 
proportions of the population distrusted the government as distrusted 
‘politicians in general’. Two other figures from the MORI poll are worth noting. 
Journalists as a group are equally distrusted as politicians – and this distrust 
is also long-standing. However, one group that is trusted, according to MORI, 
is ‘television newsreaders’. Sixty-six percent said they would trust 
newsreaders. 
 
If the belief that politicians are to be distrusted is widespread, then one can 
ask how this belief is reproduced. In a mass society, in which people have 
little direct personal contact with politicians, people are liable to receive their 
information about politicians via the media. In this context the high rating 
given to newsreaders is highly suggestive. It may be that newsreaders 
represent a trusted source of information about politicians’ untrustworthiness. 
The question, then, is to examine how newsreaders and news presenters 
might construct politics in a way that reproduces common-sense assumptions 
about the untrustworthiness of politicians. They may be doing this in ways that 
simultaneously convey their own trustworthiness.  
 
The present investigation concentrates upon this issue in relation to the 
General Election campaign. There are two considerations that have direct 
theoretical and methodological implications for the present study. First, the 
belief in politicians’ untrustworthiness would appear to be part of 
contemporary common sense. It is not a belief that is dependent on the 
actions of a particular politician or party. The possibility is that this distrust 
might be in-built into the frameworks for presenting politics in the broadcasting 
media. If this is correct, then the assumptions of distrust should be evident at 
the beginning of the General Election coverage. They will not be created as a 
reaction to the conduct of the campaign. The television coverage of the early 
part of the General Election should be particularly important for investigating 
whether the media might transmit a generalised distrust.  
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Second, if there is a widespread suspicion of politics, then this should not be 
confined to the dramatic media moments, when, for instance, a particularly 
famous and pugnacious interviewer successfully challenges the veracity of a 
politician. It should be reproduced and reinforced by more banal moments of 
political coverage. Hallin (1992) has noted that politicians’ words have 
become increasingly mediated in television news programmes. As compared 
with the 1970s, the television news now not only presents shorter extracts of 
politicians speaking, but these extracts are segmented between presenters’ 
comments and interpretations. Roland Barthes (1977), in his classic essay 
‘Rhetoric and the Image’, commented that most media images are anchored 
in text. This clearly applies to televised images of politicians: these images are 
‘anchored’ in the words of the official presenters. The question is whether this 
anchoring routinely reproduces what Paul Ricoeur (1970), in another context, 
termed ‘the hermeneutics of suspicion’. 
 
The presentational forms and the conventional rhetoric of the television news 
media, therefore, need to be closely analysed. In investigating the banal 
discourse of ideology, it is often the ‘small words’ that play a big role (Billig, 
1995; van Dijk, 1998). To understand how ‘small words’ operate it is 
necessary to examine discursive phenomena qualitatively. Therefore, the 
level of analysis will not be focussing on discovering particular news items 
that explicitly address the issue of distrusting politicians – nor to see how 
many such news items there were. Instead, banal episodes of reporting and 
commenting will be examined, in order to see whether there was a routine 
hermeneutics of distrust in the television presentation of the British General 
Election of 2005. 
 
 
Strategic Interpretation 
In the first week of the Election campaign the political parties launched their 
election manifestoes. The television channels also launched their special 
news features for covering the campaign. In some respects there were 
parallels between the two sorts of launchings. In the case of the Conservative 
manifesto and ITN news there was a simultaneous launching on the evening s 
news of April 12.  
 
The ITN coverage of the launching of the Conservatives’ manifesto followed a 
conventional pattern. The story was introduced by the main newsreader, 
Trevor Macdonald. His announcement of the manifesto and its contents 
contained an implied interpretation. According to Macdonald “there weren’t 
many surprises although Mr Howard did promise to have more police on the 
streets, better school discipline, stricter controls on immigration, and lower 
taxes”. The use of the word “although” was curious, implying, but not stating, 
that the items that followed may have been somewhat surprising. Whatever 
the precise interpretation, Macdonald was implying that the manifesto 
generally confirmed (unspecified) expectations. 
 
Then Macdonald handed over to Nick Robinson, ITN’s political editor. 
Robinson’s commentary on the manifesto was interspersed with clips of the 
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Conservative leader Michael Howard speaking at the press conference held 
earlier in the day. Howard could be heard declaiming that  “the sunshine of 
hope breaking through the clouds of disappointment”. Robinson commented: 
 
 “The rhetoric may be soaring but the promises are now familiar and the 
manifesto slim. That’s because it has one simple purpose (.) to channel 
anger with Tony Blair into votes for the Tories.” (The transcription symbols 
used here and in other extracts are explained in the Appendix) 
 
The comment is not particularly notable. It represents the sort of remark that 
television news reporters make routinely when reporting on electoral politics. 
That is sufficient to make the comment interesting as an example of a 
conventional rhetorical genre. 
 
In a general sense, the presenter was offering guidance for interpretation. The 
comment was mediating the images of Howard speaking, that the television 
producers had selected to show. Such images were not left to stand on their 
own, but viewers were given interpretative guidance. In this case, the 
guidance assumes a distinction between the manifest scene that is being 
shown and its latent, unseen and unheard meaning. The viewers might hear 
the soaring rhetoric, see the slimness of the manifesto and recognize the 
familiarity of what the politician is promising. But there is something more that 
the outward pictures and words do not of themselves reveal. 
 
In this instance, as in many others, the ‘something more’ refers to the 
strategic purposes of the politician. The presenter tells the audience that the 
politician has a reason for speaking in the way that can be heard. This type of 
interpretation, which is commonplace in electoral news presentation, can be 
called ‘a strategic interpretation’: it interprets by claiming that there is a 
strategic reason for the performance of the observed action. A strategic 
interpretation, such as that provided by Robinson, assumes a distinction 
between appearance and reality. All viewers can see what the politician is 
doing/saying: but the why is not apparent. Robinson was claiming that behind 
the manifest scene of Howard lies “one simple purpose”. This purpose is 
assumed to be non-obvious to the viewer. Expert knowledge is required to 
produce this behind-the-scene understanding.  
 
Not only does a strategic interpretation rest on the distinction between the 
manifest behaviour and the underlying, non-observed strategy but also, in the 
context of broadcast politics, it contains an implicit warning. According to 
discourse analysts, the suggestion of an underlying purpose, or ‘stake’, 
typically functions to throw doubt on, or to discount, another speaker’s version 
of event (Edwards and Potter, 1993; Potter and Edwards, 1990; Potter, 1996). 
Robinson’s own use of the term ‘rhetoric’ in this context is not accidental. In 
popular use, the word ‘rhetoric’ frequently contains an element of criticism, as 
‘mere rhetoric’ is contrasted, implicitly or explicitly, with substance (Billig, 
1996). Robinson was saying that there is something behind the ‘soaring’ 
words of Howard, thereby inviting viewers to treat what they hear with caution. 
By offering a strategic interpretation, the presenter is employing a discursive 
format that, in effect, is saying ‘beware of the outward words, for they are a 
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reflection of an inner. In this regard, the strategic interpretation, which is itself 
a rhetorical form, belongs to the hermeneutics of suspicion. Its very 
conventionality in the context of media reporting indicates the extent to which 
the hermeneutics of suspicion may have become commonplace within the 
routines of television presentation.  
 
Introducing Unspun 
After the report on the launching of the Conservatives’ manifesto, the ITN 
evening news of April 12, introduced its own special election feature – 
Unspun. Macdonald announced: 
“Throughout the campaign we’ll be attempting to help you to separate 
fact from fiction. We’ll be analysing the policies of the parties to try to 
help tell the difference between spin and substance. To do that we’ve 
recruited a panel of insiders and experts and we begin tonight with one 
of the main promises of Mr Howard’s conservative manifesto (.) 
controlling immigration. Tom Bradby reports on the Conservatives’ 
immigration claims (.) unspun” 
 
Tom Bradby, then began his report, standing against a backdrop of faces: 
“Trevor, this is the Unspun studio and these are the faces of the insiders and 
experts who are going to be helping us to get to the truth and unspin the 
rhetoric during this election campaign; they are leaders in their fields be it the 
economy, health, security, terrorism or as tonight immigration.” 
 
Then Bradby reported on the Conservatives’ figures about immigration, calling 
on experts to give assessments. He commented on Michael Howard’s claim 
that the immigrant population will continue to grow by six million. Bradby 
added “this is where he does enter the territory of spin”.  He then posed a 
question that calls for a strategic answer:  “So why does Mr Howard want to 
make immigration such an issue?” This was followed by graphics of the word 
UNSPUN revolving, and then a shot of Mr Howard shaking hands with people 
in a crowd. Bradby answered his own question over the pictures:  “One 
answer according to a former Tory spin doctor is that it resonates strongly 
with working class voters”.  
 
There were then comments from expert spin-doctors about the strategy of 
using immigration as an issue. Then came other experts talking about the 
economic impact of immigration to Britain. Bradby concluded his report with 
the words: “Of course whatever the economic arguments it’s an issue we are 
likely to hear more of and tomorrow I’ll be back with our insiders and experts 
to unspin (.) the next big issue (.) Trevor”. 
 
Several points can be noted. First and most obviously, ITN was introducing a 
set format into their coverage of the election. This slot had been planned well 
in advance; the insiders and experts had been recruited; the special set – the 
so-called special ‘Unspun studio’ - had been designed before the campaign 
had begun.  Above all, the word ‘Unspun’ had been chosen. This was not a 
one-off: it was being introduced as a special feature that would remain 
running throughout the election coverage. 
 
  Communication Research Centre 
48
The slot had its own narrative presupposition that rested upon the distinction 
between appearance and reality. The aim was to separate “fact from fiction”, 
or “spin” from “substance”. The implication was that politicians create fiction, 
spin and appearance and that they would continue to do so throughout the 
campaign. Special experts would be required to show the reality – including 
the strategic reality – behind such appearances. The presupposition of 
politicians’ untrustworthiness was not justified. In taking it for granted, the 
presenters of Unspun was displaying that they took for granted that their 
viewers would also take for granted politicians’ untrustworthiness. It is, of 
course, a mark of commonplace beliefs that they need no rhetorical 
justification for their acceptance is assumed (Billig, 1996).  
 
The same news bulletin introduced another feature that was to become a 
regular item during the course of the campaign: ‘The Body Politic’. Macdonald 
explained: “We’ve recruited the country’s top body language analyst (.) 
Professor Geoffrey Beattie from Manchester University to help us assess 
what hidden messages the politicians are sending”. In the first report, 
Professor Beattie claimed that politicians rarely revealed their aggressive 
impulses in public but such impulses “are unconsciously channelled into hand 
gestures revealing their true:: feelings”. Such claims, regardless of their 
validity, are interesting because they provide further evidence of the 
distinction between appearance and reality. Again, it is assumed that the 
expert can show the reality behind the potentially misleading surface 
impressions created by the politicians.  
 
Here we can see the hermeneutics of suspicion becoming institutionalised as 
the guiding principle of regular coverage in the election coverage. The mode 
is pre-emptive, not reactive. The experts are not called in because a particular 
politician at a particular stage of the campaign has uttered a remark that 
needs to be treated with suspicion. The experts are there because ‘everyone’ 
knows that the politicians will make utterances, create appearances and even 
make gestures in ways that conceal underlying realities. Thus, it is announced 
that the experts will be on hand tomorrow and throughout the election to 
‘unspin’ the next big issue – whatever that issue might be. In this way, the 
hermeneutics of political suspicion was a matter of routine.  
 
Appearance and Reality 
The distinction between political appearance and underlying reality was a 
widely used trope on all the main news channels in the coverage of the 
election. On the evening of the launch of the Conservative manifesto, the 
trope could also be heard on the BBC News. On the 10 o’clock evening news, 
the presenter Hugh Edwards called upon “our economics editor” in order “to 
try to establish whether the Tory plans stand up to scrutiny”.  
 
The editor began by mentioning the  “incomprehensible talk of billions and 
squillions from Gordon Brown today rubbishing Oliver Letwin’s spending 
plans”. The words of the politicians are portrayed as incomprehensible. The 
folksy tone (as represented by ‘billions and squillions’) seems to suggest that 
the economics editor is identifying with the audience’s presumed 
incomprehension. It is as if editor is saying that the all this political talk about 
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economics is way over the heads of you and me. But the overall narrative is 
conveying that the talk is incomprehensible to you, but not to me: the 
economics editor is attempting to explain and interpret the economic claims 
comprehensibly. 
 
A series of experts explained the apparently incomprehensible. The experts 
discuss the main parties’ claims to save money by cutting waste. The experts 
are sceptical. The economics editor concludes:  
 
 “The most dubious claims are actually the ones the parties agree on, they 
all say they’ll save billions of pounds …if you ignore all the pledges to cut 
waste from Mr Brown and Mr Letwin, you’re left with one shining nugget of 
truth in the river of mud that has flowed today, and that is we can expect 
the conservatives to spend (.) and tax a little less than Labour (.) Hugh”  
 
Again the words of the politicians are being contrasted with words of truth. 
Careful expert interpretation is required so that truth can be separated from 
mud.  
 
Television political presenters and interviewers must be above party 
partisanship. They use a variety of rhetorical formats to maintain distance and 
to display neutrality, for example attributing judgements, which could be 
understood as favouring one party over another, to independent sources 
(Clayman and Heritage, 2002). In this case, the economics editor is careful 
not to be understood as implying that the nugget of truth lies on one side or 
the other. The claims of the political parties are equally dubious. The word 
“actually” is suggestive, for it conveys a sense of reality: what ‘actually’ is 
occurring contrasts with what seems to be occurring. What the parties agree 
upon is actually – really – the most dubious claim of all. In this way, the editor 
avoided appearing biased by throwing doubt on all parties equally. There is an 
implicit claim. In contrast to the dubious judgments of politicians, the judgment 
of the editor about such judgments is not open to doubt. His claims match 
what “actually” is the case. The experts and the television journalists can 
excavate the nugget of truth, which the politicians cover with their self-
interested rhetorical mud. 
 
Sometimes the rhetorical trope of appearance and reality was not applied to 
the claims of politicians but to their visual images, as in the case of the Body 
Politic. April 13, the day after the Conservative launch, the Labour Party 
launched its manifesto. 
Mark Mardell the BBC’s political editor was reporting on the BBC News that 
evening. He was standing outside a plant in Northampton with a copy of the 
manifesto in his hand. “The message isn’t just delivered in words”, he was 
saying. Then he went on to give a strategic interpretation of the physical 
characteristics of the manifesto:  
“Think of the things that people say they don’t like about New Labour, 
the spin, the glossiness (.) well Tony’s little red book the new manifesto 
[holds up manifesto to camera] seems almost designed to counter that, 
in fact it seems designed in another decade, [riffles pages] lots of thick 
text and only one picture in black and white (.) it may be targeted 
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aimed at traditional Labour voters but the other parties aren’t 
impressed” 
In mentioning the disliked aspects of New Labour (the spin, the glossiness) he 
uses a distancing device, attributing the accusation to others (Clayman and 
Heritage, 2002).   Thus, he claims “people say” that they don’t like the spin of 
New Labour. By such an attribution, he indicates that he is not personally 
making the accusation: that would have been a transgression of the norms of 
neutrality. He then explains the physical characteristics of the manifesto are 
designed to counter the accusation that ‘people’ make. The text has a 
strategy between the lines that needs to be interpreted. To display the 
strategic purposes, the pages need not be read. It is sufficient that they are 
visibly riffled and the underlying meaning disclosed. 
 
The distrust of appearances was at times applied to the pictures of politicians 
that the news programmes were themselves presenting carrying. Viewers are 
shown visual images but then are warned not to trust the apparent 
straightforwardness of the pictures. An example from late in the campaign can 
be given. On May 3 Shaun Ley reported on BBC News that the party leaders 
were concentrating their efforts on marginal seats. 
 
His report included shots of Blair and Brown on the campaign trail. It looked 
as if they were walking in a car-park. Blair then was seen to buy two ice-
creams from an ice-cream van. He then offered one to Gordon Brown and 
could be heard saying “Here Gordon, not often a chance to get something 
free”. The soundtrack continued with guffaws. At this point Shaun Ley’s voice-
over continued:  
 “It may look relaxed but every aspect of this last few days of campaigning 
is carefully calculated by the parties [close-up shot of ice-cream in Blair’s 
left hand, as he signs an autograph with his right while the soundtrack has 
further background guffaws] Labour’s fear underlined by the latest opinion 
polls is that the lead it appears to have nationally [shot of Blair smiling] 
could in the seats that matter simply melt away” [Blair bites into the ice-
cream]   
The rhetorical format “it may look…but…” conveys suspicion. The format, 
when used in a voice-over, deictically points to the images that are being 
shown. In this case, the images are the ‘it’ that may appear to depict a relaxed 
scene. The ‘but’ warns that ‘things are not as they seem’: the appearances 
deceive. The viewers might think the scene depicts two relaxed figures, joking 
about an ice-cream, but they would be naïve to accept the images at face-
value. “Every aspect”, it is said, has been “carefully calculated”. If every 
aspect has been calculated, then this must include the appearances that are 
being shown and that are being indicated deictically. Thus, the apparently 
relaxed images are being interpreted as anything but relaxed and 
spontaneous. Like everything else they are the product of careful political 
calculation. Appearances are deceptive, so the interpretation warns. 
 
In this way, the voice-over anchors the seemingly relaxed scene in the 
hermeneutics of suspicion. The ice-cream is not just an ice-cream; the joke is 
not just a joke. They are products of strategic calculations that would have 
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remained concealed from the innocent viewer but for the expertise of the 
expert. 
 
Promoting the expert 
In the trope of misleading appearances and underlying strategic reality the 
role of the expert is crucial. If politicians are skilled in the arts of hiding 
underlying truths, then it takes equally experts to disclose these rhetorical 
tricks of the trade. The role of the expert, then, is to be the trusted guide in the 
territory of misleading appearance. Without the expert, the viewer might never 
be able to discover the nuggets of truth.  
 
In this context, the television programmes promote the skills of their experts. 
Their status is talked up. When ITN introduced ‘Unspun’, the people who were 
going to help “get to the truth” were “experts and insiders” who were “leaders 
in their fields”; the presenter stressed the word ‘leaders’. Before the first ‘Body 
Politic’, Trevor Macdonald described the expert decoder of gestures as “the 
country’s top body language analyst” with his professorial status emphasised. 
In this way the credentials of expertise are routinely advertised. In contrast 
with the politicians, the experts are being presented as credible figures whose 
judgements are to be trusted. They are the agents, not the objects, of the 
hermeneutics of persuasion. 
 
The difference between the presentation of experts and politicians can be 
seen in the respective ways that interviewers treat them. Politicians are 
regularly subjected to adversarial interviews, in which interviewers use a 
variety of hostile question-formats to challenge what politicians say (Clayman, 
2002; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Heritage, 2002). For example, 
interviewers frequently use ‘negative interrogations’ or ‘negative tag 
questions’ which are seen as challenging the statements that politicians 
make. Interviewers often pose quandary questions, inviting politicians to 
agree with one of two alternative answers in the knowledge that both answers 
are equally damaging to the interviewee’s credibility (see also Bull, 1998 and 
2002; Bull et al, 1996).  
 
This style of questioning differs from that which prevailed forty years ago. 
Today’s interviewers, such as Jeremy Paxman, when reflecting on their craft 
as interviewers, tend to criticise their more deferential forebears. In earlier 
days, the interviewer tended to play ‘pat-ball’, feeding the politicians with open 
topic-questions or ‘respectful prompters’ to which the politician could give 
unchallenged answers (Clayman and Heritage, 2002). The successful political 
interviewer is nowadays expected to give politicians a far rougher ride.  
 
As Clayman and Heritage stress, this is not merely a matter of professional 
advancement, although there are undoubted rewards and celebrity status for 
those who gain the reputation of being tough, uncompromising interviewers. 
Interviewers tend to justify the aggressive approach by claiming a public duty 
to question politicians rigorously because politicians in general have matters 
they wish to conceal. Jeremy Paxman, for example, is reported as saying that 
it is a sound principle, when interviewing politicians, to ask oneself ‘Why is this 
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lying bastard lying to me’ (Clayman and Heritage, 2002, quoted p. 31). In this 
way, professional ideology breeds suspiciousness. 
 
When interviewers talk to the experts of suspicion, however, they use a very 
different interview style. The setting may physically resemble the political 
interview. Interviewer and interviewee might, for instance, be seated in the 
studio. The interviewer may use conventional beginnings and endings to mark 
the openings and closings of the conversation (Clayman and Heritage, 2002, 
chapter three). But in between the openings and closings, the questions have 
a very different design. There is an absence of the adversarial question 
formats that are used to challenge politicians. Instead, there are the 
straightforward ‘pat-ball’ types of question that cue the interviewee to a broad 
topic without further adversarial follow-up. 
 
A particularly striking type of this gentle interviewing occurred on Newsnight 
April 14, when Paxman, famed as the fiercest of all television interviewers, 
played pat-ball with Frank Luntz. The latter was introduced as the American 
pollster who advised on Republican campaigns in the United States. Luntz 
was being asked to comment on the language being used by the various 
parties in the election. His answers gave strategic interpretations. Paxman’s 
‘questions’ were, in the main part, not questions in grammatical form but 
pointers to the topic that Luntz should talk about next: 
 
Paxman: err, now let’s start with the Lib Dems they launched their 
manifesto today. 
Luntz: well the two words that you’re going to hear from them 
constantly positive and fair… 
 
Luntz talked about the Liberal Democrats use of the word ‘hidden’ and the 
strategic purpose of the word. Paxman’s supplementary question does not 
challenge Luntz’s prediction or knowledge. He merely asks “Could it work?” 
inviting Luntz to speculate expertly on the potential efficacy of the Liberal 
Democrats’ rhetorical strategy.  And then it is on to the next party: “Ok what 
about Labour” and Luntz then talks about Blair and how he is attempting to 
appear non-ideological. Paxman then raises the topic of Gordon Brown, again 
without a statement not a grammatical question: “Now Brown, he’s obviously 
been playing a much bigger part than expected”. Luntz interprets this not as 
an opinion offered by Paxman but as cue to talk about Brown’s rhetoric. Luntz 
then discussed Brown’s use of the phrase “personal to all” and he commented 
“I actually think it’s good language I think it may be effective.” 
 
After that Paxman feeds the next topic: “Now as far as the Conservatives are 
concerned”. Luntz interprets this, not as a preface for remarks that Paxman 
might make, but as a cue for his own analysis of the Conservatives’ rhetoric. 
Paxman poses a question, regarding the Conservatives: “But why all the 
focus upon Howard?” Luntz answers in terms of the Conservatives’ strategy 
of exploiting Blair as an electoral weakness. Paxman responds with a tag 
question “It’s turning out to be quite an interesting election isn’t it?” This 
question is not the sort of negative tag, which challenges the interviewee, by 
asserting a criticism of the interviewee’s position and then adding the format 
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‘isn’t it?’ to turn negative assertion into question. Instead the assertion is a 
coded compliment: Luntz’s analyses have demonstrated how interesting the 
election is becoming, haven’t they? 
 
Throughout the exchange there were no probing or adversarial questions. 
Given the dominance of such questioning in contemporary political 
interviewing, one might claim that the pat-ball type of questioning represents a 
pseudo-interviewer. The interview is being used not to question interviewee 
but to permit the experts to display their expertise within a conversational 
format. In the Paxman-Luntz interview, it was the interviewee, not the 
interviewer, who controlled when to present the illustrative clips of film that 
showed politicians using particular pieces of rhetoric.  
 
The pat-ball format reflects the way that the appearance-reality trope is 
presented on television. If a hidden underlying reality is to be exposed, then 
the news programmes need to promote and protect their experts who expose 
this reality. Politicians are not the only professionals with an interest, but the 
programmes have an interest to present their experts as knowledgeable, 
respected and without an interest to promote. Thus, they might be described 
as leaders in their field, the country’s top expert etc. In this regard, the news 
presenters may find themselves using phrases that come close to the 
language of advertising. Even experts like Luntz, who in the past have worked 
for a particular political party, are treated as being above the fray and 
unmotivated. They are now ‘insiders’ who are revealing the hidden story. 
When questioned, they are treated with old-fashioned deference.  
 
Challenging the Expert 
Occasionally a politician will challenge the judgements of an expert. When this 
occurs, the reactions of the interviewer are interesting, for they reveal the 
assumption that the politician, not the expert, should be the object of 
suspicion and challenge. An example occurred on BBC’s Newsnight on April 6 
just before the official announcement of the Election but at a time when the 
unofficial campaigning had already begun. Again Jeremy Paxman was 
involved. 
 
The incident occurred during an item about the economy. Three politicians 
had been invited for a discussion with Paxman: David Miliband (a Labour 
minister), David Willetts (Conservative) and Vince Cable (Liberal Democrat). 
Sitting next to Paxman on one sofa and opposite the politicians was the 
BBC’s economic correspondent, Stephanie Flanders. Paxman introduced her, 
mentioning her expertise and giving her a feed question to display her expert 
judgment: “Well we’ll be talking to the politicians err in a moment but first 
Newsnight’s economic guru Stephanie Flanders  [turning to Flanders] how 
good has the economy been and do you think Gordon Brown deserves the 
credit for it?’ Flanders, in the course of outlining the state of the economy and 
Gordon Brown’s role in it, commented on the “small difference” between the 
two parties relating to cut in public spending.  
 
Then Paxman questioned the three politicians in turn. He started with 
Miliband. His questioning was typically adversarial. He began with a question, 
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which called into question the honesty of his party. The question semantically 
seemed to call for yes/ no answer, but either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ would be equally 
disastrous for the politician. Analysts have termed such questions as 
‘avoidance-avoidance’ questions (Bavelas, 1998; Bull, 2002). It has been 
noted that politicians, when faced with an avoidance-avoidance question 
appear to equivocate, for they cannot deliver the ‘yes’ or the ‘no’ that the 
question seems to invite: 
 
Paxman: Err David Miliband, you came from a meeting tonight in which 
the manifesto was apparently finalized signed off on. Is it going 
to be any more honest about err tax plans than the last one? 
Miliband: Well the government has lived up to all of its commitments 
Paxman:       ah come on you 
said last time you wouldn’t raise income tax instead of which you 
raised taxes on income 
 
 
Miliband starts to answer and Paxman begins to interrupt. It is in this 
sequence that Miliband criticises Flanders’s assertion about there being only 
a small difference between the parties: 
 
Miliband: just let me finish this (.) a low debt high employment economy 
does not come about by accident. A low debt unem- high un- 
high employment economy comes about because of economic 
political choices that are made and Stephanie [noise from 
Paxman as if trying to interrupt] for Stephanie to say for 
Stephanie to say that the differences between the parties are 
not significant is completely false if= 
Paxman: =Are you questioning her judgement? [using a tone that 
conveys incredularity] 
Miliband: I certainly am because I think that [shot of Flanders] a 
commitment on the part of the Conservatives= 
Paxman: =you’re a brave chap 
Miliband: a commitment on the part of the Conservatives [Paxman: 
right] to say that we should reduce the share of national income 
that’s spent by the state first to forty per cent and then according 
to Oliver Letwin and others to thirty-five percent is a major major 
assault on the economic the British economic model that has 
been developed and I don’t think we should minimize that I think 
it’s a very significant difference… 
 
The exchange deserves a more detailed analysis than can be given here, but 
several points can be noted. Paxman, who can challenge the politician’s 
honesty, does not let the challenge to the BBC’s expert pass unquestioned. 
This is not a challenge about facts or figures. Paxman characterises it as a 
disagreement with Flanders’s ‘judgment’. He succeeds in interrupting while 
the minister is making his statement disagreeing with the BBC’s economics 
guru. In fact, the Minister has not given the reasons for his disagreement. 
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Paxman, thereby, is questioning not the basis for the disagreement but the 
very act of disagreeing with the expert’s judgment.  
 
Paxman’s style of challenge should be noted. It takes the form of an 
adversarial question that seems to imply that questioning the judgement of the 
expert is somehow unusual and has to be accounted for. The design of his 
question, or at least its tone of delivery, possesses what conversation 
analysts would term a structural preference for agreement (Bilmes, 1987; 
Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Pomerantz, 1984). Where questions have a 
preference structure, then one sort of answer can be supplied without 
justification, typically by a simple assent. On the other hand, the ‘dispreferred’ 
answer needs justification: the recipient will need to do more than merely 
dissent from the assertion embedded in the question.  
 
In this case, the tone of the delivery is implying that ‘surely you are not 
questioning her judgement, are you?’ Such a question invites a denial that 
would show agreement with the presupposition that is embedded in the 
question: namely Flanders’s expert judgement is not to be questioned. 
Miliband gives the dispreferred answer. He emphasises his answer – “I 
certainly am” – rather than replying simply ‘yes’. He then goes on to justify his 
non-acceptance of Flanders’s judgment: “because I think that…” Both the 
emphasis and the justification are features of ‘dispreferred’ responses, as the 
responder rejects the invitation to confirm the question’s embedded 
presupposition and then explains the rejection (Sidnell, 2004). 
 
By employing such a question, Paxman was indicating that Miliband was 
doing something unusual in challenging the judgment of the expert. The 
acceptance of the expert’s judgment would have needed no special 
justification. Nor under normal circumstances would it provoke a challenging 
interruption from the interviewer. Paxman, having received confirmation that 
the politician was indeed challenging the judgment, then tries to interpose 
what can be heard as a jokey man-to-man aside – “you’re a brave chap”. It is 
implied, but of course not stated, that the unchallengeable status of Flanders 
might lie with her gender – only a brave man would challenge a powerful 
female guru. Miliband ignores this aside. Paxman drops the matter at this 
point. 
 
However, Paxman does not let the issue remain dropped. Later in the 
interview Miliband refers to the cost of some spending plans but he does not 
give the precise figures. He then says to Paxman: “Stephanie will give you the 
decimal points”. Paxman intervenes with a statement that challenges 
Miliband, as if exposing the minister of a contradiction: “Now you respect her 
judgment apparently”. Unusually for an interviewer such an intervention is not 
framed as a question (Clayman and Heritage, 2002), but it is an assertion that 
challenges the interviewee.  
 
The assertion is making a rhetorical point. Paxman’s assertion is designed to 
resurrect the status of the previously challenged expert in the eyes of the 
viewer. His intervention refers back to the previous exchange. Now you 
respect her judgment, Paxman is saying. Paxman has upgraded the 
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characterisation of Miliband’s reaction: before he was ‘questioning’ her 
judgement, now he is ‘respecting’ it. The implication is that if Miliband now 
respects her judgement, then surely he should have accepted it previously.  It 
should be noted that again Paxman poses the issue as one of 
accepting/respecting the expert’s judgment in general – not her judgment on a 
particular issue. In his interventions, it is her status as an expert that is posed 
as being at stake. The implication is that if her expert status is accepted – if 
she is the ‘guru’ that she is presented as being – then everyone, including 
government ministers, should defer to her judgement, whatever that judgment 
may be. 
 
Miliband does not let Paxman’s second challenge pass. He extracts himself 
from the quandary of seeming to respect her judgment at one point but not at 
another. He responds by saying that he respects the judgement of the 
Treasury that has provided Stephanie Flanders with the figures; and that as a 
Treasury minister it would be absurd not to do so. Paxman laughs. It was a 
rhetorically skilful escape. 
 
The sequence may have ended with humour, but it illustrates something 
serious. The adversarial questioning of the interviewer is directed against the 
politician, not the expert. In a matter of judgement – whether the differences 
between the political parties are great or small – the expert opinion is 
presented as the one to be deferred to. The politician is the one to be 
distrusted. If the politician challenges this, then surprise is expressed and the 
politician is made to justify himself. The common-sense assumption is 
revealed: how can a politician – someone who has just been marked as a 
figure of dubious honesty – question the judgment of the media’s own expert? 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Much more analysis would be required in order to show how the hermeneutics 
of suspicion was reproduced in its detail by the television news coverage of 
the election. Even so, a preliminary analysis reveals some interesting 
features. The suspicion of politicians is in-built into the formats and rhetorical 
conventions of reporting. One conventional trope in this reporting is the 
distinction between political appearance and reality. Politicians produce 
appearances, and sometimes untruths, but news programmes, courtesy of 
experts, will show viewers the underlying realities. The trope requires a 
distinction between untrustworthy, biased politicians and trustworthy, 
unbiased experts. The latter are required to reveal, or to unspin, the 
misleading appearances of the former.  
 
Of course, modern political parties do use sophisticated techniques to 
promote their own messages. Techniques of advertising are employed to ‘sell’ 
the message and to project the desired images. But there is a danger in 
seeing the presentation of politics as being a one-way business in which all 
the manipulation and self-interested rhetoric comes from the politicians, while 
the unbiased media seeks to get beyond the rhetoric to the truth on behalf of 
an otherwise helpless and confused electorate. 
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The media have their own interests and rhetoric. The presentation of experts 
and their own demonstration of their expertise cannot be free of rhetoric. The 
news programmes use their own promotional rhetoric when presenting these 
experts. Experts are ‘leading’ experts; they are gurus whose judgement 
should be accepted. When Trevor Macdonald and his reporter introduced 
ITN’s new ‘Unspun’ feature, they used the word ‘unspun’ several times. The 
word was flashed on the screen graphically. Like any advertising promotion, 
the product-name was being repeated, as its reliability and trustworthiness 
were being claimed.  
 
Yet the hermeneutics of distrust stops short at this point. The news presenters 
and their chosen experts are presented as being above suspicion. The 
rhetorical decoding and unspinning is directed against the parties who are 
competing in the electoral contest. The experts do not need to seek votes – 
they have no such interests and therefore can be respected. Their words do 
not require decoding: their appearances conceal no hidden realities. There is 
no conscious strategy here – just routine conventions that are so familiar that 
they appear natural. But this is the way that the hermeneutics of political 
distrust and the promotion of media trustworthiness are routinely reproduced. 
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Appendix 
 
Transcription Notation 
 
The transcription conventions, which are being used here, are based on the 
simplified notation of conversation analysis that Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
present. 
 
Underlining is used to indicate increased loudness or a speaker stressing a 
particular word or phrase. 
 
(.) indicates a noticeable short pause 
 
= indicates that one speaker’s turn is being followed immediately by another 
speaker’s turn without a pause. This typically occurs when one speaker might 
interrupt another without an overlap between the two speakers’ talk 
 
:: in the middle of a word indicate the elongation of the preceding vowel sound 
 
Square brackets [ ] are used to convey information about what is being said or 
shown. 
 
… conveys that material is being omitted 
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The Internet and the 2005 UK General Election 
John Downey and Scott Davidson 
 
This account of the role of the Internet in the 2005 UK General Election is 
divided into three parts. First, we examine the use made of the Internet by 
political parties during the campaign. Second, we discuss the role of 
‘mainstream’ Internet news providers. Finally, we assess the impact of 
political blogs. 
 
The Internet and Party Political Campaigning 
During the first days of the General Election campaign a number of journalists 
argued that the Internet would play an important part. George Trefgarne in the 
Daily Telegraph confidently predicted that the Internet would have a ‘major 
role’ (6/4/2005 p8). John Naughton in The Observer argued that the 
increasing importance of niche voters and the ideal character of the Internet to 
reach such voters would signal a sea-change in campaign strategies hitherto 
based upon print and broadcast media: ‘arcane competencies may prove to 
be a diminishing asset in a narrowcast world’(10/4/2005 p6). Such predictions, 
however, proved to be overblown and the Internet did not play a qualitatively 
greater a role in the 2005 election than it did in 2001 (Downey, 2001).  
 
As in 2001 post-election analysis turned to the question of why the Internet 
played such an insignificant role. Owen Gibson in The Guardian explained the 
relative lack of importance of blogging, for example, in UK politics in 
comparison to the USA through referring to the different characters of print 
journalism in the UK and USA (6/6/2005). As far as the UK is concerned a 
cycle seems to occur at General Elections: different aspects of the Internet 
are hyped at the beginning of campaigns (on-line voting, blogging) and then 
the failure to make an impact is analysed after the dust has settled. 
 
Why is this cycle emerging? On the one hand, the Internet is a relatively 
immature medium that is evolving rapidly in terms of technological possibility 
and in terms of use. In other words, there is always some new facet that can 
be hyped by an information elite. On the other, the Internet is likely to remain 
of marginal political importance in UK General Elections for the foreseeable 
future. Why is this?  
 
Political parties are reluctant to make full use of the potential of the Internet to 
appeal directly to voters (disintermediation) by-passing the broadcast and 
print media because a large majority of voters who are on-line and interested 
enough to visit party political websites are unlikely to be floating voters and 
thus investment in on-line campaigning is not a cost-efficient way of winning 
votes. 
 
In comparison to the last UK General Election in 2001 more UK households 
have access to the Internet (52% in October-November 2004 compared to 
38% in April-June 2001). The growth of Internet household penetration is 
slowing, however. After jumping roughly 10 percentage points in 2000 and 
2001, growth is now running at around 3% per annum. The recent boom of 
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broadband access (up 40% since 2003 so that now 36% of households have 
broadband access [Dutton et al, 2005:20]) means that the digital divide 
appears to be deepening even further. In terms of Internet access we may 
speak of three roughly evenly sized groups: the well-connected, the 
connected and the disconnected. Floating voters are underrepresented in the 
first group in comparison to the population as a whole and so the Internet is 
not the most appropriate medium to use in order to attract floating voters. 
 
There are many factors that help to explain the extent of the digital divide 
(age, location, education, income and so on). If we look at Internet access by 
household income, we can see at least a strong correlation: 
 
Internet Access by Household Income 
 
Decile 2001/2 2003/4 
Lowest 10% 10 15 
2 12 15 
3 15 20 
4 25 37 
5 33 41 
6 43 55 
7 49 60 
8 59 71 
9 67 78 
10 80 89 
All 39 48 
 
Source: adapted from Expenditure and Food Survey, Office of National 
Statistics 
 
John Naughton is correct to a certain extent, however, to argue that niche 
marketing to voters is growing in importance and sophistication. In the 2005 
General Election, for example, the Conservative Party used Voter Vault 
software that had been used by the Republicans in the 2004 US elections. 
This software categorises voters based on information drawn from the 2001 
UK census, the electoral roll, credit databases, house price data and so on. 
Households were divided into 11 categories. It has been calculated that four 
of these categories provide 90% of the Conservative vote. Four other 
categories were identified as potential vote winners. Their campaign made 
strenuous efforts to appeal to these groups in marginal constituencies 
(roughly 900,000 voters). These four groups were called: Happy Families 
(10.76% of electorate), Ties of Community (16.04%), Blue Collar Enterprise 
(11.01%) and Urban Intelligence (7.19%). While no doubt many households in 
the Happy Families category have access to the Internet, only the Urban 
Intelligence category were identified as users of the Internet for the purposes 
of gathering information about politics and current affairs (Smith, 2005). 
 
This poses a problem in terms of use of the Internet for campaigning 
purposes in that the three largest groups of target voters are either not 
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connected to the Internet or tend not to use the Internet to find out about 
politics. As Mark Pack, e-campaign spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, 
stated ‘the number of floating voters coming to a website is relatively small’ 
(Pack, 2005). Much more reasonable are niche marketing techniques to 
appeal to these voters such as phone calls, DVDs, letters, leaflets and the 
arcane practice of door step visits. Party websites and other Internet activities 
are aimed primarily, therefore, at the information elites, at journalists, at 
supporters, and at party activists who may then influence floating voters. The 
use of technology to rally and organise supporters, collect donations and so 
on is probably far more significant than its direct vote-winning potential. Many 
of the most significant uses of technology (databases, coordination of 
campaigning) are actually hidden from the vast majority of voters. 
 
On-line donations were significant in the 2004 US presidential election with 
around twenty per cent of funds collected on-line. All UK parties used the 
Internet to encourage supporters to donate money. One Labour Party email to 
supporters was claimed by the Party to have resulted in £50,000 of donations 
in less than 24 hours. Certainly the Internet is an ideal medium for parties to 
communicate with their largely well-connected supporters and activists. 
However, on-line donations as a percentage of funds raised remains very 
small. The Labour Party, for example, appears to rely overwhelmingly on 
large unions (AMICUS, TGWU) and a small number of private wealthy 
individuals for campaigning funds (http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ 
regulatory-issues/registers.cfm) in a context of dramatically declining 
membership numbers since 1997. 
 
In stark contrast to parties’ strenuous attempts to raise funds on-line it should 
be pointed out that UK political parties do not give members of the public an 
opportunity to engage in debate on their websites (in contrast to parties in 
Germany). One of the potentially most beneficial aspects of the Internet for 
encouraging political participation and dialogue is, therefore, not being used 
by UK political parties. Their concern to retain control over the process of 
political communication apparently overrides concern for reinvigorating the 
political process through on-line dialogue. This is an example of the Internet 
being normalised (made into a quasi-traditional medium) by the parties. 
 
Functional Review of Political Party websites 
 
 Labour Conserv
ative 
Liberal 
Democra
t 
SNP PC UKIP Green BNP 
News/Press 
Releases 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Email sign 
up for news 
 
Y Y Y  “suspe
nded” 
Y Y  
Donate 
money 
online 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Leaders’ 
Blog 
“Tony 
Blair’s 
Leader’s 
Wife blog 
“The 
Battlebus 
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 Campaig
n Diary” 
Blog” 
Senior Party 
Officials 
Blog 
 
“Catch 
Up with 
the 
Prescott 
Express” 
 Links to 
blogs 
from  
Peter 
Black, 
Sandra 
Gidley,  
Richard 
Allan,  
Lynne 
Featherst
one 
Y     
List of 
candidate 
blogs 
 
  Y      
Watch edits 
of PEBS 
 
Y Y Y Y    Y 
Watch other 
videos 
 
Y  Y      
Send an E 
Postcard  
 
  Y      
local 
candidate 
information 
 
Y Y Y Y   Y  
Text 
Messaging 
Sign UP 
Y Y Y      
 
All the parties included the core functions of access to news releases and 
policy information, online donations and the option to sign up for email 
communications, and it is these areas which were the most likely to have 
been updated on a regular basis.  The three main parties also incorporated 
regular blogs or diaries from senior figures from the campaign trail. Labour put 
up several video diaries, including one from Tony Blair and a picture and text 
diary from deputy leader John Prescott, which was updated daily. The 
Conservatives did not provide a blog or diary from their leader, Michael 
Howard, but instead opted for a regular campaign diary from his wife Sandra. 
The Liberal Democrats published a “Battlebus Blog” and linked to other blogs 
produced in the name of senior party officials.  
 
The ability to search for information on the parties’ candidates was provided in 
varying formats. Labour also offered web site visitors a chance to see “Our 
Personal Promise to You” by submitting some personal data, such as housing 
status, age of children etc. Once this was submitted a web page would be 
generated with summarised policies in areas relevant to the submitted 
demographical information with some localised facts and figures according to 
postcode. This provided an interesting attempt at providing the kind of 
personalised communications content that is not attainable through mass 
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communications channels. However, features such as this tended to be the 
exception rather than the rule.  
 
Segmentation – the process of defining and targeting markets – enables the 
tailoring of communications to reach target audiences with increased 
effectiveness and is an increasingly important component in UK electoral 
campaigning. Yet, in 2005 there appeared to be little, if any, significant 
Internet developments in this area. In the 2001 campaign Labour did establish 
the R U UP 4 IT? web site aimed at younger voters. Labour did not replicate 
the exercise this time around, and no party set up segmented micro-sites or 
sub-brands that in any way resembled the John Kerry and George W Bush 
campaign sites for the 2004 presidential campaign, which both created 
targeted content aimed at African American, Veteran and Hispanic voters. 
Political parties do have a number of sites that appeal to different groups of 
activists and there is some evidence that constituency party websites in 
marginal seats tailored content to suit the particular character of the 
constituency (in Guildford, for example, a Conservative –Liberal democrat 
marginal the conservative Party website fore-grounded the issue of crime and 
disorder because of perceived Liberal Democrat weakness on this issue 
(Westlake, 2005)). 
 
For all the hype about the onset of web elections, in many ways the most 
intriguing aspects of the analysis of the functionality of the party web sites is 
what functions or features do not feature. The importance of blogs? The 
Labour Party did not offer links to its own candidates’ blogs. Increased 
interactivity between citizens and politicians? No party hosted forums for the 
public. A platform for smaller parties to run imaginative campaigns? No, the 
smaller party sites provided, on the whole, fewer functions than the bigger 
parties.  
 
There are risks associated with cultivating greater interactivity for parties who 
have carefully built up internal centralised systems of command and control in 
their attempts to manage their image against a news media constantly on the 
look out for “gaffes” and divisions. A hard-headed assessment by political 
parties of the benefits of heightened interactivity will likely be weighed against 
the potential costs of losing an element of control of campaign 
communications. The economic costs of e-campaigning are also a factor. If 
only 3% of British Internet users actually visited party websites during the 
2005 campaign (Ward and Lusoli in Hansard, 2005: 16), it is unlikely that 
parties will spend substantial amounts of party funds on e-campaigning. 
 
For the political parties, the key functionality of the web is the opportunity it 
offers for them to communicate, unmediated by sceptical media filters, with a 
self-selecting audience – their activists and supporters. The web also offers 
the chance to cultivate images of modernity for the parties, even if blogs, 
video diaries and jokey emails do not win many votes, there is a perceived 
danger of being out of touch with the online world. At one point in the 
campaign the Liberal Democrats claimed to be the first party to do a “podcast” 
by offering an MP3 of a Charles Kennedy speech. Yet, this begs the question, 
if podcasting is an effective campaign tool, why did they only do it once in the 
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campaign, and not since? In essence, it appears to be a case of the 
perception of the medium being more important than the message.  
 
‘Mainstream’ News Providers 
 
As in the US, it is clear that mainstream news organisations dominate the 
Internet provision of political news in the UK thus contradicting a common 
fallacy about the supposedly decentralised free flow of information that many 
people still believe the Internet to be. Two UK sites stand out: Guardian 
Unlimited and BBC News. They both provide free access to in-depth analysis 
of British politics. They are also the two news sites with the greatest reach. In 
May 2005 the Guardian Unlimited site as a whole (i.e. not just the news site) 
had nearly 10 million unique users, of which over 3 million were UK users. 
According to Neilson, BBC online as a whole had 9.8 million unique users 
from the UK in May 2005 reaching nearly 40% of active Internet users 
(Neilson Netratings, 2005). According to The Economist, number of unique 
global users of the BBC news site has grown from 1.6 million per week in 
2000 to 7.8 million per week in 2005(Economist.com, 2005). In March 2003 
there was a 29% increase in unique UK users of BBC news to more than 4 
million (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2948833.stm) in response to the 
USA and UK invasion of Iraq. During the 2005 election campaign an 
estimated 28% of on-line British users sought out political information on-line, 
around 15% of the population. However, only 6% of users went on line at 
least once a week (Ward and Lusoli in Hansard, 2005: 14). The most popular 
source of information was BBC News: 17% of British users visited the BBC 
site (Ward and Lusoli in Hansard, 2005: 16).  
 
 In 2003 KPMG carried out a review of BBC Online services. Drawing on 
MORI research they showed that BBC News and Guardian unlimited are the 
two UK news sites with the biggest reach and time spent viewing (BBC reach 
50%; time spent viewing 50%; Guardian Unlimited reach 22.3%; time spent 
viewing 8.2%). 21% of an UK sample of Internet users had visited the BBC 
News site at least once in the previous four weeks (55% of these people were 
educated to degree level or above) (KPMG, 2003: 210). Of the 4 million 
unique users from the UK, therefore, well over 2 million were educated to 
degree level or above. In November 2004 Forrester conducted user research 
for the Guardian: 73% of users are between 18-44; 74% are educated to 
degree level or above; 64% of users belong to socio-economic groups AB; 
and 36% were based in London (Guardian Unlimited, 2005). Both of these 
sites therefore tend to be used by well-connected information elites (or 
‘young, upmarket professionals’ as The Guardian describes them) who have a 
considerably higher income and educational achievement than average. This 
elite display particular patterns of media consumption (Guardian Unlimited 
users watch 7 hours of TV per week compared to 9 for the Internet average 
and 31% of users spend 5 hours a week reading newspapers and magazines 
compared to 18% of all UK Internet users). 
 
The BBC, in line with its public service remit, offered a comprehensive and 
wide ranging web presence for the election. In addition to the large volume of 
news stories published each day, visitors could look up reference data on past 
  Communication Research Centre 
66
results, details of candidates and see the projected impact of the polls on the 
composition of parliament. Feature coverage ranged from the very simple, 
how to physically cast a vote, to more complicated explorations of social and 
economic issues.  
 
The BBC also attempted a series of fact checking articles, a trend which was 
echoed by Channel Four News who established a separate fact checking web 
site called “FactCheck” – for which the broadcaster claimed would scrutinise 
interviews, speeches and manifesto pledges - informing public debate by 
creating a popular resource for an information-hungry electorate. Many of the 
newspapers also invested considerable energy into covering the election. 
Although, in essence, what titles such as the Guardian and Financial Times 
produced was either the same as or more of what they do anyway: more 
news, more features, more commentary, more sponsored blogging.  
 
In contrast to the political parties, the media sites actively sought interactivity 
at all possible times (although the BBC once again pre-moderated their sites 
in order to observe their public service obligations). This ranged from the fairly 
passive invitations for audiences to email or sms their views and questions 
about the issues to the cultivation of audience participation in programme 
output, often with members of the “general public” replacing the journalists in 
putting the questions to politicians in interviews. There was also a wide range 
of discussion forums and message boards hosted by news producers.  
 
Blogs 
Before the election campaign a number of commentators suggested that 
blogs would play a significant role in the UK election largely because of their 
recent impact in the USA. In the USA there are a number of influential blogs 
(Daily Kos, Instapundit) that have attracted sizeable audiences and blogs 
have also been responsible for breaking significant stories (for example, the 
story that led to the resignation of CBS anchorman Dan Rather). According to 
Pew, 2% of adult Americans regularly read such blogs and an additional 3% 
sometimes do so (2005: 3). 
 
The impact of political blogs in the US encouraged the Hansard Society to 
investigate the potential of political blogging in the UK. The conclusion of their 
report would seem to support caution with respect to UK blogging potential. A 
pertinent point made is that blogs to a certain extent have become 
‘normalised’ as mainstream news organisations (such as Guardian Unlimited 
and BBC News) have jumped on the blogging bandwagon. This has been 
commented upon critically by a number of ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ bloggers (such 
as Guido Fawkes) but as they rely on mainstream media links for a good deal 
of their traffic, a sort of accommodation has developed that permits the 
mainstream to feel themselves to be cool and bloggers to feel as though they 
are not talking to themselves. 
 
Significantly, the reception research conducted by the Hansard Society 
reveals that the vast majority of people are not greatly enthused by blogging. 
Jurors found it ‘difficult to connect with bloggers’, ‘could not find enough to 
empathise, or even disagree with, in what they read’, and the blogs reviewed 
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were ‘marked by low levels of debate between visitors and this proved to be 
another turn-off for our jury’(200?: 11). As the Hansard Society chose some of 
the more high profile and interesting UK political blogs to test on the jurors the 
results are salutary for those who consider that blogging could serve to revive 
democratic participation in the UK. 
 
Data concerning unique visits are available up until April 15th 2005. From the 
beginning of April until the 15th 4 political blogs were featured consistently in 
the daily top 10 of most visited UK blogs run by Britblog (bloggers have to 
register in order to be counted – there are currently 174 registered political 
blogs): Tim Worstall, perfect.co.uk, UK Polling Report, Guido Fawkes. On one 
day, April 12th, all four featured in the top ten and had a total of under 5000 
unique visitors between them (Britblog.com, 2005).  
 
While political blogs may struggle for readers and commenters, there are a 
very large number of blogs that serve a wide variety of purposes. 
Researchers at the Centre for Mass Communication Research at Leicester 
University found 312 political blogs and categorised them in the following way: 
 
 Partisanship of UK Political Blogs 
  
Frequency Percent 
  Anti-Blair Left 29 9.3 
Conservative (MPs, Candidates, Councillors) 
19 6.1 
Pro-Conservative (Not MPs, Candidates, 
Councillors) 6 1.9 
Anti-Conservative (Not MPs, Candidates, 
Councillors) 5 1.6 
Pro-European (Single Issue) 
6 1.9 
Euro-sceptic (single issue) 
1 .3 
General/Observational (No Clear direction) 
89 28.5 
Pundit/Pollster 6 1.9 
Labour (MPs, Candidates, Councillors) 
65 20.8 
Pro-Labour (Not MPs, Candidates, Councillors) 
24 7.7 
Anti-Labour (Not MPs, Candidates, Councillors) 
4 1.3 
Independents/Other Parties (MPs, Candidates, 
Councillors) 15 4.8 
Anti-Independents (Not MPs, Candidates, 
Councillors) 3 1.0 
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Liberal Democrats (MPs, Candidates, Councillors) 
17 5.4 
Pro-Liberal Democrat (Not MPs, Candidates, 
Councillors) 3 1.0 
Anti-Liberal Democrat (Not MPs, Candidates, 
Councillors) 1 .3 
Media 10 3.2 
Pressure/Lobby Group 1 .3 
Spoof Blog 8 2.6 
Total 312 100.0 
 
Source: Dr James Stanyer, Centre for Mass Communication Research, Leicester University 
 
It would appear from this data that the right in the UK is lagging behind the 
centre and left in the blogoshere. It should also be noted that the blogosphere 
is often a far from civil civil society. There are numerous sites devoted to ad 
hominem attacks on politicians, local as well as national. This prompted 
Sheridan Westlake, editor of conservative.com, to call for greater regulation of 
blogs (2005). This would presumably treat blogs more like broadcasters (who 
must observe certain rules concerning public service such as impartiality) 
rather than newspapers. However, it is questionable to say the least to what 
extent such a suggestion is either desirable or practicable. 
 
While it appears that the audiences for political blogs in the UK are very small 
and made up almost entirely of political and media elites, that does not 
necessarily mean that they are entirely without influence. Certainly a few 
provide an extremely high level of political analysis that can rival 
commentaries in national newspapers. In addition, some commentators argue 
that the value of blogs is that they can break news that mainstream news 
organizations will not initially touch for whatever reason. They may be small 
but they act as a conduit for stories to the mass media and are, therefore, 
important. 
 
While there are a number of blogs that aim specifically to break damaging 
stories about political parties in the UK (for example, 
newlabourunplugged.com), this has not occurred. During the General Election 
campaign not one story was broken via a blog. (Bloggers are very keen to 
catch the mainstream media plagiarising their work but the results of 
investigations so far actually show the very limited influence of blogs on 
mainstream political journalism either attributed or unattributed to their blog 
source.) 
 
One potential story that could well have received mainstream coverage was 
the claim made by two of the most well-known UK political bloggers, Guido 
Fawkes and Tim Ireland, that the Labour Party had broken the 2003 Data 
Protection Act because their agents, software company Email Reaction, had 
embedded spyware into some emails that would allow responses to be 
tracked. While a complex and extremely well-informed discussion of the Data 
Protection Act and whether Labour had in fact broken the law occurred in the 
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blogosphere, it failed to register at all in national newspapers despite the 
relatively high profile of Zack Exley, head of Labour’s e-campaign, and the 
newsworthy character of a story claiming that the Labour Party was ‘spying’ 
on its supporters. 
 
Why were no stories broken by blogs during the campaign? Some argue that 
it was simply bad blogging luck and that it is a matter of time before this 
happens. Neil McIntosh, assistant editor of Guardian Unlimited, for example, 
argues that sooner or later a Private Eye-style UK blog will develop and break 
big stories. There are good reasons to be cautious about such thinking, 
however. First, it is not clear whether a Private Eye type blog would survive 
financially as Internet users are generally unwilling to pay for their news. A 
web rival to Private Eye might well serve to drive them both out of business. 
Second, and most importantly, the British press, in contrast to the US press, 
trades in scandal, intrigue, and opinion. There is no tradition in the UK of print 
‘objectivity’ that encourages the US press to be balanced in their coverage of 
political parties that can act as a barrier to breaking sensitive stories. In the 
UK, why would anyone choose to break a story for free on the Internet to a 
few thousand people when it would be possible to go directly to a mass 
circulation daily and additionally be paid handsomely for the information? A 
good deal of the popularity of blogging in the US is that it provides citizens 
with explicit political opinion across the political spectrum in contrast to much 
of the mainstream media. In the UK, national newspapers provide this to a 
certain extent already and so there does not appear to be a compelling 
reason to visit the blogosphere.  
 
Although less hyped than blogs (at least for the moment), developments in 
applications of mobile phones appear to be just as, if not more, significant. In 
particular, the ability to take pictures and videos is increasingly being applied 
in a campaign context. Both the BBC and Channel 4 encouraged the public to 
send in pictures from the campaign, as the notion of the “citizen reporter”, a 
more formal role for the passer-by as news gatherer is cultivated. Amateur 
mobile phone video, for example, was used extensively in mainstream media 
coverage of the 2005 London bombing. 
 
Conclusion 
In comparison to the 2001 General Election, more UK citizens were on-line in 
2005 and a sizeable minority had broadband access thereby accentuating the 
UK digital divide. Also the number of individuals, albeit mostly restricted to 
relatively privileged socio-economic groups, who sought information and 
political news on-line was significantly greater than in 2001. While the 
provision of political news by mainstream news providers is clearly coming of 
age in the UK, most of the content tends to reflect material to be found in the 
off-line world. 
 
In a manner strikingly similar to 2001, our key conclusion is that the Internet 
played an insignificant role in the 2005 General Election. Political parties, 
realistically, clearly do not see their websites as a large-scale direct vote-
winners and tend to focus their on-line activities on providing information for 
certain groups (journalists, supporters, activists), all of whom belong to a 
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relatively small information elite. Both political parties and mainstream news 
providers have tended to ‘normalise’ the Internet. It is very much politics or 
news as normal repackaged for well-to-do Internet users.  
 
There also does not appear to be an overwhelming desire for alternative 
sources of political news, opinion, and information on the part of the 
electorate. The UK political blogosphere did grow in profile during the election 
but its political importance remains (and is likely to continue to remain for the 
foreseeable future) extremely marginal in comparison to political blogs in the 
US. The hope that the Internet would usher in a new age of participatory 
politics populated by active e-citizens has, as yet, proved to be forlorn. 
 
*The authors would like to thank Dr James Stanyer for sharing his data with 
us and Mark Pack and Sheridan Westlake for granting interviews. 
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Chapter 4: Women’s Magazines and the 2005 Election 
 
(Dominic Wring and David Deacon) 
 
 
Whereas there has been a notable decline in the circulations of national 
newspapers over the last two decades other media have, by contrast, 
experienced significant growth in their sales, audiences and influences.  
Publishers in the women’s magazine sector have been particularly successful 
in gaining new readerships and launching new titles.  The burgeoning range 
of weeklies is especially noteworthy and it offers an alternative kind of news 
media to the more established formats.  Though dominated by popular 
culture, some of the titles have featured politicians with or without their co-
operation and this kind of reporting represents another manifestation of the 
way senior elected figures are increasingly being portrayed like celebrities.  
There is of course no more high profile example of this than the present Prime 
Minister, a leader who has long been viewed as an adept and versatile media 
performer.   
 
Like his predecessor John Major, Tony Blair has consciously attempted to 
communicate his message to women, particular demographic groups of whom 
are often portrayed as being essential to any party seeking to win office.  
During the run-up to 1997 the most prominent target of this kind was 
‘Worcester Woman’, whereas the 2005 equivalent became ‘School Gate 
Mums’.  The latter were in evidence in a variety of broadcast formats, notably 
Channel Five’s experimental day of audience based discussion programming 
featuring the three main leaders some weeks before the formal 
announcement of the election.  Several women, most notably a nurse 
together with the mother of an autistic child, memorably confronted the Prime 
Minister on aspects of his health and education policies.  Blair and his rivals 
also made attempts to reach women voters by appearing in other less formal 
current affairs discussion programmes like GMTV and This Morning.   
 
Another variation on ‘School Gate Mums’ was the overwhelmingly female 
readership of Take A Break (i.e. Take A Break woman) a remarkable 
publishing phenomenon that now sells in excess of a million copies every 
week.  Consequently, as an innovative experiment, the research team 
monitored a wide selection of women’s magazines during the period covered 
by the project to gauge whether and in what ways these media were 
interested in the election.  Whilst campaign related material appeared in 
prominent monthlies such as Cosmopolitan it was felt the weeklies offered, by 
definition, a news driven format likely to be more sensitive to and engaged 
with the unfolding campaign.  The chosen sample comprised all magazines 
defined as ‘Women’s Interests: Women’s Weeklies’ by the Audit Bureau of 
Circulation barring one title primarily aimed at the Republic of Ireland.   
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List of publications monitored 
Title Circ. (millions) 
Bella 422,963 
Best 400,638 
Chat 623,567 
Closer 500,202 
Heat 539,983 
Hello 323,591 
My Weekly 233,744 
New 357,523 
Now 597,827 
OK 468,928 
People’s Friend 341,506 
Reveal 239,907 
Star 176,983 
Take a Break 1,211,016 
That’s Life 597,016 
The Lady 34,419 
Woman 512,158 
Woman’s Own 436,356 
Woman’s Weekly 401,965 
 
Conscious of its massive circulation, the eve-of-poll edition of the largest 
selling Take A Break self-consciously proclaimed that its near four million 
readers could make the difference in what it declared to be the ‘UK’s first 
Women’s Election’ (5th May).  A major three page feature, ‘Votes for Sale’, 
concentrated on those deemed by the editors to be women’s priority issues:  
childcare, pay, pensions, safety, health-care and, more specifically, abortion.  
Each of the three major parties’ policies was briefly elaborated upon but the 
only printed comments from the three main leaders were clarifications of their 
stances on the latter issue.  Woman’s Own also incorporated a similar feature 
over the course of successive issues (11th and 18th April) in which two 
different groups of readers aged between 32 and 49 were able to ask Blair 
and Howard questions.  The agenda differed from that of Take A Break and, 
reflecting perhaps the magazine’s slightly older, more conservative 
readership, concentrated on crime and personal security.  Howard received a 
decidedly warmer response from his interrogators than did Blair.   
 
Closer magazine had journalist Sophie Barton question Blair in an interview in 
which he consciously acknowledged the ‘stressful life’ pressures facing those 
‘trying to bring up kids, work and pay off a mortgage’ and responded to a very 
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similar agenda to that of Take A Break (30th April).  In doing so he would have 
been conscious of his own strategists’ prioritising of ‘hard working families’ as 
a key target group.  The interview also highlighted Labour’s pledge to improve 
breast cancer treatment as well as more details about Blair, his son Leo and 
his justification for invading Iraq.  Mention was made of his heart problems 
and there were several references to his health and whether he was quite as 
recovered as he appeared.  Interestingly the cultural agenda-setting Heat 
almost managed to avoid mention of any politicians but for one full page, long 
range photograph of a naked to the waste Tony Blair (7th May).  The picture 
featured in the magazine’s ‘Torso of the Week’ might be easily dismissed as 
another minor feature but for the favourable subtitle ‘Yes, it really is him!’ and 
the clear impression it gave of a man who was very fit for his age.  The health 
of the nation rather than Blair informed another feature that was similarly 
favourable to the Prime Minister and which demonstrated his ability to use 
incumbency to maximum publicity effect.  Consequently by inviting the Jamie 
Oliver into Downing Street for a meeting he acknowledged the importance of 
the chef’s Channel 4 television crusade to improve the quality of school food 
whilst gaining a Hello photo-opportunity and story which was complimentary 
about Blair’s pledge to spend an additional £280 million on catering for 
children’s meals (11th April).   
 
The only other political figures to appear in women’s magazines were Ann 
Widdecombe, Harriet Harman and Sandra Howard.  All three interviews 
concentrated on non-intrusive aspects of their personal lives and discussed 
their career trajectories.  A Hello feature with Harman was dominated by 
photographs of the minister in her home and with her mother and sisters 
together with a brief review of her life and achievements.  The interview 
steered clear of the election but touch on the issue of maternity rights whilst 
focusing on the difficulties facing a professional career woman seeking to 
developing a work-life balance (5th May).  The Widdecombe interview with 
Woman’s Own hardly touched on politics at all (25th April).  Far more intriguing 
was the Closer piece billed ‘At Home With the Howards’ but which only 
featured the Conservative leader’s wife Sandra (9th April).  The interview, 
conducted in the politician’s home, focused on the couple’s family life and 
enabled her to present her husband Michael as far less austere than his 
popular image suggested.  The subsequent discussion ranged over the 
success of Jamie Oliver’s campaign, abortion laws and a diplomatic 
avoidance of questions about the Blairs.  Mrs Howard’s many media 
appearances contrasted with those of her predecessor Ffion Hague who was 
often seen but never heard in the 2001 campaign. 
 
The Conservatives were also the only party to advertise in the women’s 
weeklies and placed variations on their core slogan ‘Are You Thinking What 
We’re Thinking’ in the best-selling title Take a Break and the more glossy and 
fiercely competitive Hello and OK magazines.  The messages conveyed the 
kind of sentiments that would probably have originated in a focus group 
session with target female voters:   
• ‘Put Matron in charge and we’d soon get cleaner hospitals’ (OK 19th 
April; Hello 28th April; Take A Break 28th; April 3rd May; Hello 5th May) 
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• ‘Seeing more police on the streets would make me feel safer’ (OK 19th 
April; Hello 21st April; Take A Break 5th May; Hello 5th May) 
• ‘How can my daughter learn anything if teachers aren’t allowed to 
discipline unruly kids?’ (Hello, 21st April; OK 26th April; Hello 28th; OK 
3rd May) 
 
It is noteworthy that Conservative strategists restricted their messages to core 
‘bread and butter’ issues of health, education and crime and thereby avoided 
reference to either the controversial ‘dog whistle’ issue of asylum and 
immigration or Blair’s own allegedly untrustworthy reputation, topics which 
both featured widely in other party advertising.   
 
Overall the most obvious point to note about the women’s weeklies’ election 
coverage was the lack of it.  12 of the 19 titles in the sample featured no 
advert, photograph, story or mention of the general election or any of those 
involved in it.  Even the birth of Charles and Sarah Kennedy’s son Donald at 
the beginning of the campaign failed to generate much human interest 
reporting although it is understandable that the Liberal Democrats were 
cautious to avoid being accused of using the event to gain publicity.  
Ultimately the lack of women’s magazine coverage suggests that politics, 
politicians and their family members were not likely to increase or even 
maintain sales in this highly competitive market.  It was therefore 
understandable that no title attempted to develop a distinctive campaigning 
identity in the style of one the more popular national newspapers.   
 
 
